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INTRODUCTION
On the night of January 7, 1994, the Morris J. Berman, a barge
loaded with nearly 35,000 barrels of fuel oil, broke loose from its
tugboat and ran aground near Puerto Rico’s famous Escambron
Beach.1 Earlier that evening, the tugboat’s captain had made
negligent repairs to the towing cable which resulted in its ultimate
failure. The grounding released approximately 750,000 gallons of oil
into the ocean near the beach during the peak of the tourist season.2
The barge had been sent adrift when its tugboat’s faulty towing cable
broke.3 As a result of the enormous clean-up costs incurred by the
federal government,4 the damage caused to Puerto Rico’s tourist
industry,5 and the desire to send a strong message of deterrence,6 the
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico imposed
the largest criminal fine in history for violating a federal
environmental regulation.7 Three sister corporations8 that owned
1. See Three Corporations Fined $75 Million for Puerto Rico Oil Spill Largest Federal
Environmental Criminal Fine in U.S. History, D.O.J.-ENR PRESS RELEASE, Sept. 25, 1996, available in
1996 WL 545066, at *1 [hereinafter Three Corporations Fined].
2. See id.
3. See id. (reporting that the captain had made an improper emergency repair to the
tugboat’s cable and had plead guilty to violating the Clean Water Act negligently).
4. See id. (noting that government clean-up costs totaled $90 million).
5. See id. (reporting that the disaster occurred during the peak of the Puerto Rican tourist
season, affecting one of its most popular resort beaches).
6. See id. at *2 (quoting United States Attorney Guillermo Gil: “This $75 million sentence
will never repay the damage done to our environment, but we are pleased that this fine will
serve to send a strong message to corporations and others that environmental offenses will be
dealt with severely.”).
7. See id. at *1.
8. See id. (noting that Judge Laffitte found that Bunker Group, Inc.; Bunker Group,
Puerto Rico; and New England Marine Services were part of an umbrella organization of 50

both the tugboat and the barge were fined a total of $75 million.9
Yet, this was not the largest oil spill in United States history. The
1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, considered to be “the largest
environmental crime in U.S. history,”10 resulted in the release of over
$11 million gallons of oil into the environment,11 more than fourteen
times the amount released by the Morris J. Berman. Despite the fact
that the Exxon Corporation could have incurred a multibillion dollar
criminal fine,12 it was sentenced to pay only $25 million,13 just a third
corporations owned by the Frank family of New York that were “organized into a complex web
that allowed the family to shield its assets from criminal fines”).
9. See id.
10. See Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, “Crimtorts” as Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 289, 331 (1998).
11. See Government Suits in Exxon Valdez Spill Settled with $1 Billion Deal, SAN DIEGO UNION &
TRIB., Oct. 9, 1991, at A3 [hereinafter Government Suits Settled]; see also Historical Overview of the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (visited April 5, 1999) <http://www.oilspill.state.ak.us/nwhistory.html>. As a
direct result of this environmental disaster, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
requiring ships transporting oil to have double hulls so as to decrease substantially the
likelihood of future disasters on a similar scale. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 46 U.S.C. §
3703(a) (1994); S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 2-3 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723-24
(specifically citing the Exxon Valdez disaster as the impetus for passage of the Act, noting that
“[a]t the present time, the costs of spilling and paying for [oil-spill] clean-up and damage is not
high enough to encourage greater industry efforts to prevent spills and develop effective
techniques to contain them. Sound public policy requires reversal of these relative costs”).
12. See Environmental Groups Want a Multibillion Fine for Exxon, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 27,
1991, at C4 (reporting that ten national and state groups argued that Exxon could be subject to
fines of several billion dollars under federal pollution law).
13. See Judge Endorses $1 Billion Exxon Valdez Settlement, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1991, at A4
[hereinafter $1 Billion Settlement] (reporting that the judge forgave $100 million of $125 million
fine because of “Exxon’s voluntary efforts to pay some civil claims and its cleanup work”). This
rationale, however, confuses the remedial nature of civil litigation and clean-up with the
punitive nature of criminal fines. Whereas civil actions are meant to make victims whole or
otherwise remedy a harm, criminal penalties are designed to reflect society’s disapprobation of
the offense in question. See, e.g., Richard M. Cooper, Separate Civil and Criminal Penalties Are Now
OK, BUS. CRIMES BULL.: COMPLIANCE & LITIG., Jan. 1998, at 1, 3 (noting the distinction
between criminal fines, intended to deter and punish, and civil penalties, designed to
compensate and remediate). Thus, courts have even held that civil penalties do not necessarily
lessen the need to impose additional criminal fines for the same offense. See Hudson v. United
States, 522 U.S. 93, 103 (1997) (holding that payment of civil penalties and criminal fines which
may arise out of the same offense do not violate double jeopardy as they are different in kind
and intent); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C3.3(a) (1998) (stating that a
court shall reduce an organization’s otherwise valid fine “to the extent imposition of such fine
would impair its ability to make restitution to victims”); David Bancroft, et al., Some Current Issues
in the Sentencing of Companies for Environmental Crimes, in CRIM. ENFORCEMENT OF ENVTL. L, at
181, 186 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, 1997) (noting that the court is required to reduce a
criminal fine only when enforcing the fine would jeopardize the organization’s ability to pay
restitution) (citing United States v. Eureka Labs., Inc., 103 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 1996)). There is
no evidence that Exxon would have been unable to make restitution had the $125 million
criminal fine been imposed. It is therefore ironic that Judge Holland had initially rejected an
offer by Exxon to pay a $100 million criminal fine—in addition to $900 million in civil
penalties—on the grounds that such a settlement was too lenient. See $1 Billion Settlement, supra,
at A4. It was only after Exxon agreed to pay an additional $25 million in criminal fines that the
case settled. See id. But despite holding out for a greater criminal fine totaling $125 million,
Judge Holland forgave $100 million of that fine. See id. Exxon was thus fined $75 million less
than it would have been fined under the first settlement package. Was such a fine a sufficient

of the fine imposed upon the owners of the Morris J. Berman. Thus,
for every gallon of oil spilled in the waters off Puerto Rico, a $100 fine
was imposed, but for every gallon of oil spilled in the waters off
Alaska, a fine of only $2.27 was imposed. Are the waters off Alaska
really less valuable than the waters off Puerto Rico?
The above comparison exemplifies the problematic nature of
disparate criminal sentences.
Although these two incidents
represented substantially similar offenses, the courts imposed
remarkably different sentences without apparent justification for the
discrepancy.14 Such a situation is, of course, incompatible with a
criminal justice system responsible for meting out consistent15 and
just punishment.16
As argued below, had federal fine guidelines for corporate17
environmental crime existed at the time of the oil spills in Alaska and
Puerto Rico, it is likely that the resultant sentences would have
reflected more appropriately the relative impact those disasters had
on the environment.18 More importantly, through the imposition of
criminal sanction? According to Rodger Schlickeisen, President of the environmental group
Defenders of Wildlife, “[g]iven Exxon’s 1991 first-quarter profits of $2.2 billion, this hardly
amounts to punishment that fits the crime.” See Government Suits Settled, supra note 11, at A3.
Additionally, in 1996, after receiving a $5 billion fine in punitive damages for causing severe
damage to the local Alaskan economy, Exxon was still the most profitable corporation in
America. See Richard Teitelbaum, Exxon: Pumping Up Profits, FORTUNE, Apr. 28, 1997, at 134.
See generally Koenig & Rustad, supra note 10, at 333-34 (noting that the five billion dollar award
nevertheless “served a social purpose by sending a message not only to Exxon, but to the entire
industry, that environmental protection must be a top priority”). Given that the large civil
penalties that arose from the Exxon Valdez disaster did not appear to affect Exxon very much, it
is difficult to determine what, if any, impact the $25 million criminal fine had upon Exxon.
Moreover, in a national survey of 1005 adults, 56% felt that even the $100 million fine
contained in the first settlement package was insufficient. See Gallup Poll Shows Most Want Exxon
to Get Bigger Fine, S.F. CHRON., May 3, 1991, at B16. Thus, it does not seem that Exxon—
notwithstanding the fact that it paid heavy civil penalties—received its just desert.
14. One of Congress’ objectives in passing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was to
“narrow[] the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by
similar offenders.” See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A(3).
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1994) (noting that a factor to be considered in sentencing
is “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar conduct”).
16. See id. § 3553 (a)(2)(A) (noting that another factor to be considered in sentencing is
the need to “provide just punishment for the offense”).
17. According to Chapter Eight of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, entitled “Sentencing of
Organizations,” organizations include not only corporations, but also “partnerships,
associations, joint-stock companies, unions, trusts, pension funds, unincorporated
organizations, governments and political subdivisions thereof, and non-profit organizations.”
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.1 cmt. n.1. The term “organization,”
moreover, is not limited in meaning to the entities enumerated above, but encompasses all
entities other than individuals. See id. This Comment, therefore, will utilize the more general
term “organization” rather than “corporation” when referring to guideline issues.
18. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A(3). (“[T]he Commission
developed these guidelines as a practical effort toward the achievement of a more honest,
uniform, equitable, proportional, and therefore effective sentencing system.”).

federal fine guidelines for organizational environmental crime, not
only would the problem of disparate sentencing be largely
remedied,19 but organizations convicted of environmental offenses
would also be more likely to receive punishment that “reflect[s] the
seriousness of the offense.”20 Furthermore, given the serious nature
of such offenses, convicted organizations would be required to
implement effective compliance programs,21 thereby substantially
reducing the likelihood of repeat offenses.22
By requiring
organizations to implement compliance programs as a condition of
probation, courts will thus motivate the voluntary adoption of
compliance programs as a preventive measure, thereby reducing the
chance of violations occurring at all.23
Currently, no federal sentencing fine guidelines address
organizational environmental crime.24
Despite the fact that
environmental crime consists of a variety of offenses, including water
pollution,25 air pollution,26 the illegal storage and transportation of
19. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A(3) (noting Congress’ desire via
the promulgation of sentencing guidelines to achieve reasonable uniformity in sentencing by
narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similarly situated offenders).
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(2)(A) (listing the need for the sentence “to reflect the
seriousness of the offense” as first in a series of factors that the court must consider in imposing
a sentence ).
21. See infra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing the nature and purpose of
compliance programs).
22. See infra note 111. For example, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 brought a
significant change to organizational sentencing in terms of possible types of sentences. See
Emmitt H. Miller, III, Recent Developments: Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational
Defendants, 46 VAND. L. REV. 197, 201-03 (1993). Prior to the Act, a corporation could not be
sentenced to both a term of probation and a fine. See id. at 201. Not only may both now be
imposed, but other conditions such as restitution, community service, restrictions on business
activities, and regular meetings with a probation officer may also be imposed. See id. at 203
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)).
23. See infra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing how the Proposed Guidelines for
sentencing organizations that have committed environmental offenses will motivate the
implementation of compliance programs so as to reduce fine exposure, but at the same time
punish more severely those organizations that do not have such programs at the time of the
offense).
24. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.1 cmt. n.2 & background (specifying
the inapplicability of the Organizational Guidelines’ fine determination provisions to
organization offenders who have violated Chapter Two, Part Q entitled “Offenses Involving the
Environment”). Though the fine provisions of the Organizational Guidelines do not apply to
organization environmental offenders, the provisions concerning restitution and remediation
do. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 8A1.1 (noting the applicability of Chapter Eight,
“Sentencing of Organizations,” to “the sentencing of all organizations for felony and Class A
misdemeanor offenses.”).
25. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)
(1994) (stating that the Act’s purpose is to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
(Ocean Dumping) Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1994) (stating that the Act’s purpose is “to
regulate the dumping of all types of materials into ocean waters and to prevent or strictly limit
the dumping into ocean waters of any material which would adversely affect human health,
welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment”); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.

hazardous material,27 and wildlife endangerment.28 Although in 1993
an Advisory Working Group on Environmental Sanctions29 to the
United States Sentencing Commission (hereinafter the “Advisory
Group”) created and proposed organizational fine guidelines for
environmental crime (hereinafter the “Proposed Guidelines”),30
those guidelines were never adopted.31 Since then, the issue of
implementing federal fine guidelines for organizational
environmental crime has lain largely dormant32 even though the
frequency and severity of organizational environmental crime
continue to increase.33
Although there are currently no
Commissioners at the United States Sentencing Commission,

§ 300f(1) (1994) (regulating the levels of contaminants introduced into public water systems).
26. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1994) (stating that the purpose of the
Act is “to protect and enhance the quality of the nation’s air resources so as to promote the
public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population”).
27. See, e.g., Solid Waste Disposal (Resource Conservation and Recovery) Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6901(b) (1994) (regulating the disposal of solid waste and hazardous waste in or on land to
protect human health and the environment); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation & Liability (CERCLA) Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994) (regulating hazardous
substances); Federal Hazardous Material Transportation Statute, 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5127 (1994)
(regulating transportation of hazardous materials).
28. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994) (stating that the
purpose of the Act is “to provide a means whereby ecosystems upon which endangered species
and threatened species depend may be conserved”).
29. The Advisory Group consisted of government prosecutors, members of the defense
bar, academics, and other professionals who developed proposals and recommendations for the
Commission. See Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 255 (1993) (noting the unique nature of the environmental Advisory
Working Group members in terms of their diverse backgrounds); see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Environmental Crime and Punishment, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 3, 1994, at 5 (discussing the politically and
professionally balanced composition of the Advisory Working Group on Environmental
Sanctions); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (1994) (requiring the Commission to consult with
outside experts on federal criminal justice when it reviews or revises the Guidelines).
30. See Notice of Public Availability of Final Report of Advisory Working Group on
Environmental Offenses, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,764 (1993) (reporting on the Commission’s receipt of
the draft of proposed sanctions for organizations convicted of environmental offenses from the
Advisory Working Group on Environmental Offenses and solicitation of public comment on the
draft).
31. See Douglas A. Berman, Editor’s Observations, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 204, 204 (1996)
(reporting on the Commission’s initial decision to forgo extending Chapter Eight’s fine
provisions to environmental crimes due to the distinct nature of such crimes, subsequent
assembly of an expert advisory group to develop Chapter Nine guidelines specific to
organizational environmental crimes, and the eventual decision to not to implement Chapter
Nine); Nagel & Swenson, supra note 29, at 254-258 (noting that the Commission’s rationale for
not extending Chapter Eight to environmental crimes was the unique nature of such crimes).
32. See Judson W. Starr & Gregory S. Braker, Sentencing Guidelines for Corporate Environmental
Crimes: Is it Fine Having No Fine Guidelines? 2 (April 30-May 2, 1997) (unpublished article
presented at the Sixth Annual Federal Sentencing Guidelines Seminar, Federal Bar Ass’n,
Tampa Bay Chapter) (on file with American University Law Review) (noting that the proposed
organizational guidelines for environmental crimes appear to be stalled).
33. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (discussing both the increase in
occurrence of environmental crime as well as increased enforcement efforts by the EPA).

appointments are likely within the near future.34 These new
Commissioners will undoubtedly be anxious to continue the
important, though currently stalled, work of promulgating and
amending sentencing guidelines. Anticipating this, the time is ripe
for serious reconsideration of the adoption of federal fine guidelines
for organizational environmental crime. No longer should we have
to ask, “What’s your water worth?”35
Part I begins with a brief review of the philosophy behind the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,36 the legislation which created the
United States Sentencing Commission.37 The history and rationale
behind the 1991 adoption of the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines38 (“Organizational Guidelines”) is also discussed. The fine
determination provisions of the Organizational Guidelines, however,
specifically excluded environmental offenses.39 Therefore, Part II
examines the reasons for the exclusion of environmental crime from
the fine provisions of the Organizational Guidelines. Part III
introduces the Proposed Guidelines and explains how they differ
from the Organizational Guidelines. Part IV then argues that
although the Proposed Guidelines are incomplete and perhaps in
need of modification, they nevertheless provide a workable
sentencing structure upon which the Commission may devise fine
guidelines for organizations convicted of environmental crime.
This Comment concludes in Part V by noting the timeliness for
adopting organizational guidelines for environmental crime. A
growing number of cases, coupled with substantial public support in
favor of effective criminal sanctions, indicate that the Commission
should no longer tolerate the lack of sentencing guidelines for
organizational environmental crime. With the appointment of new
Commissioners, the United States Sentencing Commission will once
again have the opportunity to establish sentencing policies that
provide consistent and just punishment for organizations that
34. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT,
1998 YEAR-END REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Jan. 1, 1999) (stating that the fact that there
are currently no Commissioners is “paralyzing a critical component of the federal criminal
justice system,” and calling on the President and the Senate to give this situation their
immediate attention).
35. This question, of course, may also be addressed with regard to the earth, air, and most
importantly, one’s health.
36. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994) (outlining the composition and duties of the United
States Sentencing Commission).
37. See id.
38. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (1998) (promulgating the
sentencing guidelines for organizations).
39. See id. § 8C2.1 cmt. background (excluding environmental offenses from the
application of the fine provisions of Chapter Eight).

commit environmental offenses.40
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES

A. The Formation of the United States Sentencing Commission
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act,41 perhaps the
most revolutionary reformation of the American criminal justice
system in history.42 This Act created the United States Sentencing
Commission (“Commission”),43 an independent agency within the
judicial branch of the federal government charged with
promulgating mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines which aim
to advance the basic purposes of criminal punishment, namely:
40. It should be understood at the outset that this Comment does not necessarily advocate
adoption of the Proposed Guidelines in their current form. They are, after all, incomplete. For
the reasons discussed in this Comment, however, the Proposed Guidelines do provide a better
alternative sentencing structure than the fine provisions of the Organizational Guidelines, and
can achieve the ends of criminal punishment better than merely leaving things as they are now.
It is the author’s position that the Commission ought to adopt organizational environmental
sentencing guidelines, in some form or other, sooner rather than later. Thus, the scope of this
Comment is limited to advocating the adoption of environmental sentencing guidelines for
organizations and not some specific formalization of such guidelines. Therefore, discussions of
the legitimacy of both the United States Sentencing Commission and the criminalization of
corporate activity, especially environmental regulatory violations, are outside the scope of
argument. Admittedly, environmental regulation, especially its corporate criminal component,
is a very contentious issue. See, e.g., Benjamin S. Sharp, Environmental Enforcement Excesses:
Overcriminalization and Too Severe Punishment, C617 ALI-ABA 179, 181 (1991) (arguing that
“[t]he commitment to criminalization [of environmental regulatory violations] too often
sacrifices more socially desirable goals of remediation . . . and the creation of environmental
benefit,” and further suggesting that such “overcriminalization and excessive punishment are
themselves harms to society”). Likewise, the very existence of federal sentencing guidelines is
the source of enormous debate. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, The Failure of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s Guidelines, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 131 (1993) (arguing that the Guidelines should be
substantially revised or replaced because federal judges and practitioners have not accepted
them and the Guidelines have not reduced sentencing disparities). Nevertheless, the fact
remains that Congress has created a federal sentencing commission to promulgate sentencing
guidelines for all federal crimes. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (noting that the purpose of the
United States Sentencing Commission is to “establish sentencing policies and practices for the
Federal criminal justice system”).
Given that Congress has criminalized violations of
environmental regulations, the United States Sentencing Commission has the authority to
promulgate sentencing guidelines for such offenses. In light of the above, this Comment
assumes, without argument, the legitimacy of both the United States Sentencing Commission’s
authority to promulgate guidelines for the sentencing of federal offenses and Congress’
criminalization of corporate environmental crime.
41. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2017 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994)).
42. See Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 132 (1991) (“The Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 revolutionized the manner in which district courts sentence persons convicted of federal
crimes.”); cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367-412 (1989) (reviewing the philosophy
and rationale of the United States Sentencing Commission while upholding the Commission’s
constitutionality).
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (detailing the duties of the Commission).

deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation.44 In
the pursuit of these goals, the Guidelines were to provide “certainty
and fairness” in criminal sentencing.45
After performing an
exhaustive study which analyzed data from over 40,000 federal
sentences and holding numerous public hearings, the Commission
enacted the Guidelines on November 1, 1987.46
B. The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
Initially, the Guidelines predominantly covered individuals
sentenced for criminal violations of federal law.47 On November 1,
1991, however, pursuant to its mission to amend continually the
Guidelines as necessary,48 the Commission adopted guidelines for
organizational defendants (“Organizational Guidelines”).49
Organizations, by their very nature, are able to “mobilize vast
resources” for their economic ends.50 This mobilization results in the
creation of more jobs,51 the facilitation of technological advances,52
and the stimulation of economic growth.53 Yet, the power that
organizations wield is not always beneficial.54 Organizations can
44. See FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 1 (Roger W. Haines, Jr. et al. eds.,
1996-1997).
45. See 28 U.S.C. 991(b)(1)(B).
46. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A(3) (1998).
47. See Miller, supra note 22, at 212 (noting that the initial Guidelines dealt “almost
exclusively with individual sentencing”).
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (“The Commission periodically shall review and revise, in
consideration of comments and data coming to its attention, the guidelines promulgated
pursuant to the provisions of this section.”); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch.
1, pt. A(5) (noting the extensive use of empirical data in the formulation of the initial
guidelines as well as in the continued refinement of the Guidelines).
49. The Organizational Guidelines first appeared in November of 1991. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, infra app. C, amend. 422 (amending the guidelines to cover
organizations); see also supra note 17 (providing the Guideline’s definition of the term
“organization”).
50. See Miller, supra note 22, at 198 (noting the prominent role organizations play in
American society by virtue of their ability to pool resources on a large scale).
51. See Ira M. Millstein, The Responsible Board, 52 BUS. L. 407, 407 (1997) (noting that the
economy is fueled by prospering corporations that provide critical jobs and income); see also W.
Birch Douglass, III, Intrafamily Sales, Loans, and Guarantees, in SOPHISTICATED EST. PLANNING
TECH., at 337, 397 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, 1992) (stating that 95% of all jobs in the United
States are created by corporations).
52. See generally Bob Violino, Defining IT Innovation: The Informationweek 500 All Share a Bold
Willingness To Take Fresh Approaches to Using IT, INFORMATIONWEEK, Sept. 1998, at 58, available in
1998 WL 13852189 (discussing how organizations develop and use new technologies to benefit
business).
53. See Mark Baker, Privatization in the Developing World: Panacea for the Economic Ills of the
Third World or Prescription Overused?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 233, 266 (1999)
(discussing the widespread view among economists that privatization of industry and growth of
private enterprise leads to economic growth); see also Miller, supra note 22, at 198 n.4
(discussing the enormous economic and political power of the world’s largest corporations that
may exceed that of most countries and every state in the Union).
54. See id. at 199 n.5 (noting that corporate crime far outweighs street crime in terms of its

produce dramatic economic problems55 and on occasion, even inflict
physical harm not just on the environment,56 but on those who
populate that environment.57 As recent history has illustrated, “the
social harm caused by organizations greatly exceeds the harm that
individuals cause.”58 With this in mind, the Supreme Court has
recognized that organizations can be held criminally liable for their
actions.59 Thus, with increasing incidences of economic and social

adverse economic effect on society).
55. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 36 (6th ed. 1998) (noting the enormous losses
suffered by investors due to the numerous savings and loan failures that occurred during the
1980s); see also Cherif Cordahi, Environment: Polluters Should Face Criminal Prosecution-Lawyers,
INTER PRESS SERV., May 8, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2260940 (reporting on an United Nationssponsored conference paper noting the close causal relationship between poverty and
environmental degradation created by corporate activity).
56. See Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll, Criminal Sanctions for Marine Pollution, N.Y.
L.J., Dec. 26, 1997, at 3 (summarizing the Exxon Valdez, Morris J. Berman, and North Cape oil
pollution disasters, which together cost the American taxpayer hundreds of millions of dollars
in clean-up fees).
57. See, e.g., David Lauter, First a Slew of Dead Fish, Now Sick People Environment: A Virulent
Microorganism in Eastern Waters May be Linked to Human Illness—and Farms, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20,
1997, at A1 (reporting on the connection between massive fish-kill, human illnesses, and
commercial poultry farm waste-water run off); Marilynn Marchione, Human Waste May be Crypto
Culprit Study Suggests Source of Outbreak wasn’t Cattle, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Oct. 18, 1997, at
1A (reporting that contaminant that caused more than 100 deaths and 403,000 illnesses in
Milwaukee in 1993 may have been of human origin although waste water from cattle farms was
still considered the prime suspect); Odwalla Pleads Guilty, Will Pay $1.5 Million in Juice Case, L.A.
TIMES, July 24, 1998, at D2 (reporting on Odwalla Corporation’s guilty plea and $1.5 million
fine, the largest criminal fine in a food injury case in history, stemming from the death of a
child as well as injuries suffered by 66 others due to E. Coli contamination of the corporation’s
apple juice).
58. Miller, supra note 22, at 199. Although the United States had the highest average
annual homicide rate in the developed world in 1993, hundreds of thousands of additional
deaths were caused every year by industrial accidents, consumer products, and environmental
pollution. See id. at 199. Amazingly, street crime costs society roughly 5% of what corporate
crime costs. See id. (citing Laureen Snider, The Regulatory Dance: Understanding Reform Processes
in Corporate Crime, 19 INT’L J. SOC. L. 209 (1991)).
59. In New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court
upheld a corporation’s vicarious criminal liability for the acts of its agent where the agent had
violated interstate commerce regulations by offering illegal rebates to customers so that they
would ship their goods through the corporation. In so holding, the Court enunciated the
following principle:
We see . . . every reason in public policy, why the corporation which profits by the
transaction, and can only act through its agents and officers, shall be held punishable
by fine because of the knowledge and intent of its agents to whom it has entrusted
authority to act . . . and whose knowledge and purposes may well be attributed to the
corporation for which the agents act. . . . [T]o give [corporations] immunity from all
punishment because of the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot
commit a crime would virtually take away the only means of effectually controlling the
subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.
New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495-96 (1909); see also
HAMILTON, supra note 55, at 9 (“A corporation has been treated as an entity separate and
distinct from its owners for centuries . . . . In the United States, . . . [corporations are even]
given many of the constitutional protections available to flesh-and-blood individuals,” as well as
constitutional restrictions delimited by the criminal law).

harm being perpetrated by organizations,60 coupled with the fact that
each one of those incidences are generally far more detrimental to
public welfare than acts committed by individuals,61 it was natural for
the Commission to adopt sentencing guidelines for organizational
offenders.62
The Organizational Guidelines first appeared in the Commission’s
1991 Annual Report.63 Their ultimate purpose was to “provide
incentives for organizations who self-police and self-report criminal
conduct, but mandate high fines for organizations who have no
meaningful program to prevent and detect criminal violations.”64 In
addition to this “carrot-and-stick” approach65 toward encouraging
organizational
compliance
with
federal
regulations,
the
Organizational Guidelines were designed to reflect the seriousness of
a particular crime by imposing not only criminal fines, but also
requiring organizational offenders to pay restitution and remediation
to victims of the offense.66
Under the Organizational Guidelines, after an organization is
convicted of a crime, the court must determine either the pecuniary

60. See infra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing the increase in organizational
environmental crime).
61. See Miller, supra note 22, at 199 n.5 (discussing societal costs of corporate crime).
62. See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 29, at 213-15 (stating that the Commission’s rationale
for adopting organizational guidelines was two-fold: first, there existed a lack of consensus in
federal courts regarding corporate sentencing; second, the Commission’s congressional
mandate was not limited to sentencing reform to individuals but extended also to
organizations); see also Richard S. Gruner, Towards an Organizational Jurisprudence: Transforming
Corporate Criminal Law Through Federal Sentencing Reform, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 407, 407-410 (1994)
(noting that prior to the implementation of the federal sentencing guidelines, which
substantially raised maximum fines for corporate offenses, the small number of organizational
prosecutions was due in large part to the relatively small fines available for corporate offenses);
Miller, supra note 22, at 201 (noting that the Sentencing Reform Act altered the availability of
probation, fines, and restitution as sentencing instruments for corporate defendants).
63. See 1991 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. ch. 2, at 6.
64. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (1998) (discussing how the presence
of an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law can mitigate the sentence).
65. See Richard Gruner, Challenges in Drafting Corporate Sentencing Guidelines for
Environmental Offenses, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 212, 213 (1996) (characterizing the reward and
penalty structure for corporate fines as a “carrot and stick” approach).
66. The general principles of Organizational Guidelines are to:
(1) “order the
organization to remedy any harm caused by the offense . . . as a means of making victims whole
for the harm caused;” (2) impose fines “sufficiently high to divest the organization of all its
assets” if it operated primarily for criminal purposes; (3) base a fine range on “the seriousness
of the offense and the culpability of the organization;” and (4) impose a period of probation
“when needed to ensure that another sanction will be fully implemented, or to ensure that steps
will be taken within the organization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct.” See
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 intro. and cmt. The Guidelines listed restitution first
for a reason. According to 18 U.S.C. § 3572(b), “the court shall impose a fine . . . only to the
extent that such fine or penalty will not impair the ability of the defendant to make restitution.”
18 U.S.C. § 3572(b) (1994); see also Miller, supra note 22, at 201-02 (discussing the changes in
the use of restitution, fines and probation under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).

gain67 the organization received by committing the offense, or the
pecuniary loss68 third parties suffered as a result of the offense.69 This
determination, in turn, determines the Offense Level70 as established
by the appropriate guideline for the offense.71 For example, if an
organization is convicted under a fraud statute, the Organizational
Guidelines direct the court to apply the guideline for “Offenses
Involving Fraud or Deceit.”72 Depending on the amount of gain or
loss, an Offense Level is extracted from a chart located in that
subsection of the Guidelines.73
Once the Offense Level has been determined, the court then
determines a “Base Fine” utilizing the Offense Level Fine Table in the
Organizational Guidelines.74 The court must then determine the
culpability of the organization by considering such aggravating
factors as the level and degree of management involvement,75 and
prior criminal history.76 Conversely, the court must also consider
mitigating factors such as the presence of an effective compliance
program,77 and the organization’s cooperation during any
investigation conducted by law enforcement officials.78
These aggravating and mitigating factors determine the “culpability
score,”79 which is then used to obtain minimum and maximum fine

67. A “pecuniary gain” is defined as “the additional before-tax profit to the defendant
resulting from the relevant conduct of the offense” and “can result from either additional
revenue or cost savings.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3(h).
68. A “pecuniary loss” is defined as “the value of the property taken, damaged, or
destroyed.” Id. § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3(i).
69. See id. § 8C2.4(a) (setting the Base Fine as the amount determined under the Offense
Level Fine Table based upon either the pecuniary gain to the organization or the pecuniary
loss, whichever amount is greater).
70. An Offense Level is a number that, for organizations, corresponds to a fine amount.
See, e.g., infra app. A (listing the various Offense Levels and corresponding fines for the
Organizational Guidelines).
71. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.3(a) (requiring application of the
appropriate Chapter Two Guideline to determine the base Offense Level for the organization’s
offense or conviction).
72. See id. For the relevant subsection of the Guidelines regarding Offenses Involving
Fraud or Deceit, see id. § 2F1.1.
73. See id. § 2F1.1(b)(1) (representing the Offense Level Chart for incremental amounts of
pecuniary loss).
74. See id. § 8C2.4(d) (correlating the Offense Levels to Base Fine Amounts); infra app. A.
75. See id. § 8C2.5(b) (discussing the various factors a court must weigh in determining
management involvement, including size of organization).
76. See id. § 8C2.5(c) (increasing the Offense Level for organizations with other criminal
convictions within 10 years of offense).
77. See id. § 8C2.5(f) (allowing up to a three point decrease in the Offense Level “[i]f the
offense occurred despite an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law”).
78. See id. § 8C2.5(g) (allowing the organization up to a five point deduction for prompt
reporting of the violation, full cooperation, and acceptance of its responsibility).
79. See id. § 8C2.6 (directing a court to use the number obtained from section 8C2.5 as a
culpability score).

multipliers from a culpability score table.80 By multiplying the Base
Fine by the minimum and maximum multipliers, a fine range is
determined within which the court may set the fine.81 Thus, under
the Organizational Guidelines, two factors are required to determine
a fine for an organization: (1) the pecuniary gain or loss arising out
of the offense, and (2) the organization’s culpability.82
The Commission believed that by using these factors to determine
sentences for organizations, it could achieve three main objectives:
(1) define a model for good corporate citizenship; (2) make
corporate sentencing fair; and (3) create incentives for organizations
to control their actions by complying with the law.83 As discussed in
Part II, a theoretical problem quickly arose in those cases where
neither the pecuniary gain or loss, nor the organization’s culpability
could be determined readily.
II. Why Environmental Crime Was Excluded from the Organizational
Guidelines’ Fine Provision
Although the Organizational Guidelines extend to all federal
crimes, environmental crime is specifically excluded from the
provision governing the determination of fines.84 According to Ilene
H. Nagel, former Commissioner and Co-Chair of the Commission’s
Advisory Group on Environmental Sanctions,85 the reason why
environmental crimes were excluded was that there was a “consensus
80. See id.; infra app. B (reproducing the Culpability Score Table from the Organizational
Guidelines).
81. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.6 (1998) (listing corresponding
Culpability Scores with corresponding Minimum and Maximum multipliers); id. § 8C2.7
(instructing the court to multiply the Base Fine by the Minimum Multiplier to determine the
minimum guideline fine range and by the Maximum Multiplier to determine the maximum
guideline fine range); id. § 8C2.8(a) (listing the various policies a court should consider such as
setting the fine so as “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,
provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public from further
crimes of the organization”).
82. For an excellent review of the sentencing process under the Organizational Guidelines,
and the roles pecuniary gain, loss, and culpability play in it, see Justin A. Thornton and Harry J.
Stathopoulos, Corporate Punishment: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, S.C.
L., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 29 (including a discussion regarding the effect of the Organizational
Guidelines on business operations and internal compliance programs).
83. See Win Swenson, The Organizational Guidelines’ “Carrot and Stick” Philosophy, and Their
Focus on “Effective” Compliance, in UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SECOND SYMPOSIUM ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, CORPORATE CRIME IN
AMERICA: STRENGTHENING THE “GOOD CITIZEN” CORPORATION 34 (Sept. 7-8, 1995) (discussing
the relationship between the goal of having companies undertake effective crime-controlling
actions and the general goals of the Guidelines to met out fair and determinate punishment).
84. In addition to environmental offenses, food and drug, RICO, and export control
violations are among the other offenses not covered by the organizational guidelines. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.1 cmt. n.2.
85. See Coffee, supra note 29, at 5 (listing the composition of the Advisory Group).

that these offenses might be sufficiently different from other kinds of
crimes that organizations commit” to warrant deferment until further
study and debate was possible.86 Four “principle considerations” were
offered in support of the Commission’s decision to forgo including
environmental crime under the fine provisions of the Organizational
Guidelines: (1) the problem of determining the Base Fine; (2) the
problem of determining culpability; (3) the problem of overlapping
enforcement; and (4) the problem of balancing economic and
environmental interests.87 Each of these considerations will be
discussed in turn.
A. The Problem of Determining Base Fines
First, unlike other organizational crime, the pecuniary gain or loss
for an environmental offense either inadequately represents the
seriousness of the offense or is simply indeterminable.88 Generally, an
organization that has committed an environmental offense is
attempting to escape paying for either the required permit fees or for
the proper disposal of its hazardous waste.89 In terms of monetary
savings, such a “gain” does not appropriately reflect the severity of the
crime.90 Additionally, there are generally no particular or identifiable
victims of environmental offenses.91 Even when property damage
results, it may be difficult to estimate the monetary damage caused by
the offense92 because of the time it takes for the damage to manifest
86. See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 29, at 256.
87. See id. at 256-58 (reviewing the four considerations).
88. See id. at 256.
89. See Starr & Braker, supra note 32, at 3 (distinguishing environmental crime from other
areas of white collar crime, in terms of the small economic gain to be had by not complying
with environmental regulations versus the extraordinary cost associated with cleaning up a
contaminated site); see also Angus Macbeth, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime: Problems in
Sentencing Organizations for Environmental Offenses, 7 TOXICS L. REP. (BNA) 1313, 1315 (Apr. 7,
1993) (“Most white-collar crime aims at getting other people’s money by improper means . . . .
[I]n environmental law the economic motive is reversed: [o]ne [sic] is trying to avoid the cost
of appropriate waste disposal.”); Raymond W. Mushal, Fines for Organizational Environmental
Criminals—Two Approaches, But Still No Satisfactory Solution, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 206, 206
(1996) (“[M]ost environmental crimes are economic crimes. They arise from violators . . .
trying to save money by avoiding environmental protection requirements . . . .”).
90. See Starr & Braker, supra note 32, at 3 (noting the lack of correlation between the high
cost of cleaning up hazardous waste and the low cost of merely paying for the proper disposal of
waste in first place).
91. In most pre-sentence reports that the author has reviewed, the general public is said to
be the “victim” of the environmental crime. A pre-sentence report is a document produced by
a probation officer for the benefit of a judge to assist her in sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3552
(1994) (discussing the nature and use of pre-sentence reports in the sentencing process). Such
a finding is nevertheless quite abstract and, furthermore, does not assist the probation officer in
making a determination of actual monetary damages.
92. See Starr & Braker, supra note 32, at 3 (“[T]here is an entire class of cases in which
‘clean-up’ costs may be difficult, if not impossible, to calculate. For example, in cases involving
air emission violations, there may be no way to measure costs because clean-up is simply not

itself.93 Moreover, in many cases, such as a one-time release of
asbestos, there are neither actual victims, nor any property damage
whatsoever.94 In those situations there simply is no pecuniary loss to
calculate.95 Because these calculations drive the determination of a
Base Fine, the Organizational Guidelines simply cannot
accommodate environmental crime within its sentencing structure.
B. The Problem of Determining Culpability
Second, unlike most crimes, the violation of environmental
regulations is often a strict liability offense;96 as a matter of public
policy, such offenses do not require a showing of fault to convict.97
Although a “knowing” or “negligent” standard is an element of an
applicable statute, just the fact that an environmentally adverse
discharge occurred may be enough to constitute a criminal
violation.98 As a result, because a determination of culpability must
possible.”).
93. See id. at 3-4 (noting the competing theoretical methodologies for calculating loss).
There is the direct and calculable method for determining loss that ties costs to the cost of
remediation, but this ignores the long-term impact of environmental crime. See, e.g., John G.
Mitchell, In the Wake of the Spill: Ten Years After Exxon Valdez, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Mar. 1999, at
96 (discussing the continuing adverse impact of the Exxon Valdez oil spill on the Alaskan
environment). Yet, trying to project potential loss is also difficult, if not impossible to do. See
Starr & Braker, supra note 32, at 3.
94. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of measuring clean-up
costs, if any).
95. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
96. Though there are intent elements within many environmental statutes, i.e., usually a
“knowing” or “negligent” provision, Congress and the courts have held that environmental
crimes are crimes against the public welfare, and therefore offenders are held strictly liable for
their environmental offenses. See Jason M. Lemkin, Comment, Deterring Environmental Crime
Through Flexible Sentencing: A Proposal for the New Organizational Environmental Sentencing
Guidelines, 84 CAL. L. REV. 307, 337 (1996) (“In contrast to most other areas of criminal law, an
organization can be convicted under many environmental statutes on a showing of negligence,
or even on a strict liability theory.”); see also Starr & Braker, supra note 32, at 4 nn. 7-8 (citing
United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) (stating that
where the handling of hazardous waste is involved, it is presumed that the handler is aware of
the regulations governing the handling and disposal of such waste); United States v.
Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d 1523, 1530 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding the criminal provision of the Clean
Water Act to be a matter of public welfare); United States v. Heuer, 4 F.3d 723, 728 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act to be a public health statute).
97. See GREGOR I. MCGREGOR, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 117 (1994)
(noting that environmental statutes fall within a class of public welfare statutes that do not
require a showing of “the criminal common law standard of intent or deliberate wrongdoing”).
The standard for public welfare statutes is low “[b]ecause of the societal benefit gained from
these statutes . . . .” Id.
98. See Lauren A. Lundin, Sentencing Trends in Environmental Law: An “Informed” Public
Response, 5 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 43, 52 (1993) (noting that “[c]ourts frequently interpret the
statutes in a manner that lowers the level of knowledge necessary for a criminal conviction”).
Lundin’s article cites United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1450 (11th Cir. 1988), as an example
of the tendency of courts to lower the knowing requirement to the level of strict liability. That
is, “criminal liability for environmental violations may attach merely by doing an act in a
manner prohibited by the regulations, regardless of the actor’s state of mind.” Star & Braker, supra

be made in order to calculate the fine range, the Organizational
Guidelines are unable to accommodate environmental crimes.99
C. The Problem of Overlapping Enforcement
The third problem raised by then-Commissioner Nagel is that
enforcement of environmental regulations between federal, state,
and local agencies for environmental regulations overlap more than
the regulations governing any other organizational crime.100 It has
been the belief of the Commission that such redundancy would, for
the majority of organizational crime, entail prosecution
predominately at either the state or local levels.101 This belief may
have been confirmed by the fact that during the late 1980s and early
1990s, only ten percent of all federal organizational crimes were
environmental crimes.102 Apparently, such a small group of cases did
not warrant formal incorporation into the Organizational Guidelines.
D. The Problem of Balancing Economic and Environmental Interests
The fourth and most significant reason why environmental crime
was excluded from the Organizational Guidelines was the difficulty of
“how to balance concerns for the environment with concerns for
corporate effectiveness.”103
There was also concern that the
Organizational Guidelines would impose overly harsh fines on
organizational offenders, especially given the fact that a “heartland”

note 32, at 5 (emphasis added); see also BENEDICT S. COHEN, NATIONAL LEGAL CTR. FOR THE
PUB. INTEREST, CORPORATIONS AND THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES
15 (1993) (noting that violations of environmental regulations may result “in criminal liability
even if they were accidental or otherwise unintentional, because some environmental statutes have
been construed to reduce or eliminate the scienter requirement normally found in criminal statutes”)
(emphasis added). Thus, awareness of the illegality of the action that violated a regulation “is
generally not an element of a federal crime.” Neil S. Cartusciello, Stanley & Fisher, P.C.,
Application of Current Supreme Court Mens Rea Jurisprudence to Environmental Laws
Conference, Sept. 17-18, 1998, on file with the American University Law Review).
99. For example, because determining scienter is generally irrelevant, counterintuitive
scenarios become possible. For example, a good-faith transporter misled to believe a facility has
the proper permits to accept waste is just as guilty of violating the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act as a transporter who negligently fails to determine whether the facility has the
proper permits to accept waste. See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 29, at 257.
100. See id. at 258; see also Starr & Braker, supra note 32, at 6 (suggesting that overlapping
enforcement schemes provide sufficient deterrence because of the increased threat of civil
enforcement from state and local agencies).
101. See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 29, at 258 (observing that “[s]tate and local
enforcement of environmental violations . . . can be more co-extensive with federal
enforcement efforts than is the case with other frequently committed organizational offenses,
such as . . . fraud, tax, or antitrust violations”).
102. See id. at 258 n.276 (reporting that environmental crimes accounted for approximately
10% of federally prosecuted organizational crimes for the period 1988 through June 30, 1990).
103. Id. at 258.

of case law had yet to be developed.104 Therefore, the Commission
postponed addressing organizational environmental crime pending
further study and debate.105
III. THE PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
Despite its exclusion from the Organizational Guidelines, the
Commission still considered establishing sentencing guidelines for
organizational environmental crime a primary concern. Soon after
the Organizational Guidelines were adopted, the Commission
enlisted the assistance of an Advisory Group to develop and propose
guidelines for such crimes.106 The Advisory Group came to the same
conclusion as the Commission, that to extend the application of the
Organizational Guidelines to environmental crime would either
“punish the environmental offender more severely than other
offenders”107 or perhaps, not severely enough.108 Consequently, the
104. See Lemikin, supra note 96, at 328-29 (discussing the lack of an “experience baseline”
upon which the Proposed Guidelines could be based); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A.4(b) (1998) (defining “heartland” as “a set of typical cases embodying the
conduct that each guideline describes”). When it first promulgated the Guidelines, the
Commission undertook a comprehensive study of 40,000 convictions and 10,000 augmented
pre-sentence reports to determine what the pre-guideline sentencing practices were for
particular areas of crime. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A.1. Those
practices established the “heartland” for the various areas of criminal law after which the
various sentencing guidelines within the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual were modeled. See
id. ch. 1, pt. A.5. Given the fact that 107 organizations are known by the Commission to have
been convicted of environmental offenses since 1991, see infra note 170 and accompanying text,
the Commission has ample data to determine what constitutes heartland conduct for
organizational environmental crime. Moreover, guidelines apply to other types of offenses for
which the commission has far less data. For example, in fiscal year 1997, the Commission
reported cases involving one instance each of offenses involving bribery, gambling, and
immigration, see U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 95 (1997), all of which have applicable guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.1(a) (listing
bribery, gambling, and immigration offenses as subject to the organizational guidelines). Thus,
while in the past there may have been an insufficient number of cases from which the
Commission could reasonably draw conclusions about what constitutes the typical
organizational environmental offense, there is certainly now more than enough organizational
environmental cases for the Commission to review.
105. See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 29, at 256 (noting that environmental crime was
sufficiently different from other organizational crime to warrant separate Guideline treatment).
106. See Berman, supra note 31, at 204 (noting the Commission’s creation of an Advisory
Working Group on Environmental Sanctions was composed of two Commissioners and sixteen
public and private sector lawyers); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994 (o) (1994) (requiring the
Commission to “consult with authorities on, and individual and institutional representatives of,
various aspects of the Federal criminal justice system” when reviewing or revising the
guidelines).
107. Paul E. Fiorelli & Cynthia J. Rooney, The Environmental Sentencing Guidelines for Business
Organizations: Are There Murky Waters in Their Future?, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 481, 494
(1995); see also Mushal, supra note 89, at 207 (discussing the inadequacy of the Chapter Eight
Organizational Guidelines with respect to determining appropriate sentences for
environmental crime). But see Starr & Braker, supra note 32, at 9 (arguing that the draft
environmental guidelines for organizations would generally impose greater fines for offenses of

Advisory Group proposed an alternative methodology to determine
the fines for organizational environmental offenders.
A. The Mechanics of the Proposed Guidelines
The Advisory Group developed sentencing guidelines that would
be codified in an entirely new chapter of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, “Chapter Nine.”109
Similar to the Organizational
Guidelines, the Proposed Guidelines impose higher fine ranges for
higher Offense Levels.110 As with the fine determinations made under
the Organizational Guidelines, the Proposed Guidelines provide for
substantial fine mitigation for compliance programs, even more so
than the Organizational Guidelines.111 The substantive difference
a particular level than under the existing Chapter Eight Guidelines).
108. See Fiorelli & Rooney, supra note 107, at 494 (discussing the inadequacy of basing a
corporate environmental fine upon either the pecuniary gain or loss resulting from the
offense).
109. See infra app. C.
110. Compare infra app. C (Proposed Guidelines’ Fine Table), with infra app. A
(Organizational Guidelines’ Fine Table).
111. Compare PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9C1.2(a), reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing
Guidelines for Environmental Violations, 24 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 30, at 1378-87 (Nov. 16, 1993)
[hereinafter Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines] (allowing for up to an eight-level decrease in
offense level), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (allowing, at most, a threelevel decrease for the presence of a qualifying compliance program). According to James T.
Banks, a former member of the Advisory Group, the significant penalty mitigation that the
Proposed Guidelines provides for qualifying compliance programs “breaks new ground . . . not
only for sentencing policy, but for environmental enforcement in general,” insofar as
organizations with comprehensive compliance programs can mitigate their potential criminal
liability far more than could be done via “traditional, reactive programs.” See James T. Banks,
Substantial Penalty Mitigation for Environmental Crimes: A “Gold Standard” Proposal Worth
Considering, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 216, 216 (1996); see also Lucia Ann Silecchia & Michael J.
Malinowski, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Does Sentencing for Environmental Crimes Fit Within the
Guidelines?, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 230, 232 (1996) (characterizing the Proposed Guidelines as
an improvement over the Organizational Guidelines insofar as they are better tailored to
environmental compliance program policy).
Not only do the Proposed Guidelines offer more of an incentive to organizations that
implement compliance programs than do the Organizational Guidelines, but they also outline
more specifically what constitutes a qualifying compliance program. See Banks, supra, at 217.
According to Banks, the Organizational Guidelines offer inadequate guidance to organizations
that wish to implement environmental compliance programs since the focus of the Guidelines
is on reducing the likelihood of criminal offenses. See id. Banks argues that such a focus is too
narrow for effective environmental compliance because it does not encompass the “principal
causes of most environmental violations: management inattention, sloppy practices, inadequate
self-policing, ignorance in the workforce, and lack of motivation by production-oriented
workers.” Id. In comparison, the eight factors outlined in section 9D1.1 (a) of the Proposed
Guidelines focus on the implementation of compliance programs which aim to “prevent [both]
civil and criminal environmental violations.” Id.
The eight “Minimum Factors Demonstrating a Commitment to Environmental Compliance”
in qualifying compliance programs are: (1) line management attention and substantial
involvement in execution of compliance program; (2) thorough integration of environmental
policies throughout organization; (3) frequent auditing and continuous on-site monitoring;
(4) employee training in regulatory requirements; (5) cash incentives or other types of awards
to employees who have demonstrated commitment to environmental compliance;

between the Organizational and the Proposed Guidelines, however, is
that the Offense Levels under the Proposed Guidelines correspond to
percentages of statutory maximums rather than the predetermined
amounts found in the Organizational Guidelines Fine Table.112
For example, an Offense Level of ten under the Organizational
Guidelines requires the imposition of a fine of between $20,000 and
$40,000.113 In contrast, under the Proposed Guidelines, an Offense
Level of ten sets the fine range at 25% to 35% of the applicable
statutory maximum.114 Therefore, the resulting dollar-amount fine
range under the Proposed Guidelines is dependent upon the
statutory maximum for that offense. Thus, if the statutory maximum
for a particular offense is $500,000, then the dollar-amount fine
range would be $125,000 to $175,000, whereas the fine range would
be only $50,000 to $75,000 where the statutory maximum is $200,000.
B. Why the Proposed Guidelines Were Not Adopted
Probably the most profound and well-known objection to the
theory of corporate criminal liability is that “corporations have
neither bodies to be punished, nor souls to be condemned . . . .”115
Thus, the fundamental problem with corporate criminal liability is
that the traditional form of punishment, i.e., imprisonment, is
unavailable; therefore, the only way to punish organizations is to

(6) consistent and visible disciplinary procedures for compliance program violations including
reporting individual conduct to law enforcement; (7) organizational self-evaluation procedure
to ensure progress toward environmental excellence; and, optionally, (8) incorporation of
innovative approaches to environmental compliance. See PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9D1.1,
reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, supra, at 1382-84. Thus, the Proposed Guidelines
encourage the prevention of environmental violations before they occur rather than focusing
upon remedies to violations after they have occurred. See Banks, supra, at 217. Given that most
environmental offenses are strict liability crimes, organizations that implement compliance
programs consistent with the Proposed Guidelines will not only greatly reduce both their civil
and criminal exposure, but will be rewarded with substantial fine mitigation should an offense
nevertheless occur. Compare PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9C1.2(a), reprinted in Draft Corporate
Sentencing Guidelines, supra, at 1381-82 (deducting up to eight levels from Offense Level when an
organization demonstrates the presence of a qualifying compliance program prior to the
offense), with id. § 9C1.2(c), reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, supra, at 1382
(deducting only two levels for organizations that take prompt remedial action).
112. See infra app. A (listing base fine amounts for specialized offense levels).
113. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8C2.4(d), 8C2.6 (1998). Under section
8C2.4(d), an Offense Level of ten sets the Base Fine at $20,000. See id. § 8C2.4(d). Applying
the Base Fine to the Culpability Score Table at section 8C2.6 and further assuming a culpability
score of five (the default score), the minimum multiplier is 1.00 and the maximum multiplier is
2.00. See id. § 8C2.6. Therefore, the resulting fine range is $20,000 to $40,000. See infra apps. A
& B.
114. See infra app. C.
115. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 550 (3d ed. 1979) (quoting Edward, First
Baron Thurlow). This is usually quoted as: “Did you ever expect a corporation to have a
conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked?” Id.

impose a fine.116 Because the same result may be accomplished
through civil punitive damages, however, some question the necessity
of holding corporations criminally liable for their acts at all.117
Likewise, environmental crime itself presents an anomalous issue
for a traditional sentencing framework118 insofar as it is historically
associated with civil tort actions rather than with criminal sanctions.119
Consequently, when these two areas of law are combined, the
following problem arises: How ought we determine just punishment
for non-traditional offenders who have committed non-traditional
crimes?120
The Proposed Guidelines were not adopted ostensibly because they
magnified the above-mentioned theoretical problems associated with
both the Organizational Guidelines and environmental crime.121 Not
surprisingly, since their release, the Proposed Guidelines have been
much maligned as unreasonable and unnecessary.122 Additionally,
116. See New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909)
(holding that although “[a] corporation cannot be arrested and imprisoned in either civil or
criminal proceedings, . . . its property may [nevertheless] be taken either as compensation for a
private wrong or as punishment for a public wrong”).
117. See Silecchia & Malinowski, supra note 111, at 232 (arguing that criminal prosecution of
environmental offenders is redundant due to existing civil penalties); see also Sharp, supra note
40, at 191 (arguing that “punishment of environmental offenses (even most white collar crimes)
cannot be justified on the grounds of incapacitation, rehabilitation or . . . specific deterrence”
and may deter socially desirable behavior) (emphasis added).
118. See Freda Adler, Offender-Specific vs. Offense-Specific Approaches to the Study of Environmental
Crime, reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME AND CRIMINALITY 35 (Sally M. Edwards et al. eds.,
1996) (noting that some criminologists argue that environmental offenses are not truly
criminal, but regulatory offenses).
119. See Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy (2d ed.
1996), reprinted in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 206 (Robert V. Percival and Dorothy C.
Alevizatos eds., 1997) (retracing the evolution of environmental law from nuisance law and
other areas of the civil common law).
120. See Silecchia & Malinowski, supra note 111, at 230 (noting that individual
environmental guidelines have been criticized because they do not give weight to scienter as do
other guideline offenses, and discussing the critique of organizational guidelines insofar as
organizations are non-traditional offenders). But see Richard J. Leon, Environmental Criminal
Enforcement: A Mushrooming Cloud, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 679, 679 (1989) (noting that adverse
public response to the Exxon-Valdez disaster as well as other environmental disasters caused by
corporations indicated that “society’s need for retribution and deterrence is better satisfied
through criminal prosecution than civil law suits”).
121. In fact, two members of the Commission’s Advisory Group were ultimately dissatisfied
with their own work product. See Enforcement: Guideline Advisory Group Members Urge Sentencing
Commission to Reject Draft, DAILY ENV’T REP., Jan. 6, 1994, at D7 [hereinafter Reject Draft]
(reporting on Lloyd S. Guerci and Meredith Hemphill Jr.’s dissent to the Proposed Guidelines
on the bases that a separate sentencing structure was not justified, there was disparity between
the Proposed Guidelines and the existing organizational Guidelines, and because excessive
fines would be derived under the proposed sentencing structure).
122. See Mark A. Cohen, Environmental Sentencing Guidelines or Environmental Management
Guidelines: You can’t Have Your Cake and Eat it Too!, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 225, 226 (1996)
(“The proposed [guideline’s] fine table has little to do with the harm caused by the offense.”);
see also Patrick J. Devine, Note, The Draft Organization Sentencing Guidelines for Environmental
Crimes, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 249, 249-50 (1995) (noting that the immediate reaction to the

there was significant disagreement among the Advisory Group on
several key issues concerning certain calculations.123
The ultimate reason for declining to adopt the Proposed
Guidelines, however, may have had less to do with the Proposed
Guidelines per se as with the lack of political support for their
adoption, according to former-Commissioner Michael S. Gelacak, CoChair of the Advisory Group.124 The issue of striking an appropriate
balance between the economic interests of organizations, and the
public’s interest in protecting the environment had obviously
remained unresolved.
IV. WHY IT IS TIME TO IMPLEMENT SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR
ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
Although the Proposed Guidelines are incomplete125 and may need
release of an initial draft of the Proposed Guidelines was overwhelmingly negative, and
criticizing the initial draft “as unduly complicated, overly severe, unjust and unnecessary”). A
revised version faired no better. See Enforcement: Dissent Filed by Advisory Group Members Urges
Sentencing Commission to Reject Draft, 24 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 36, at 1594 (Jan. 7, 1994)
(quoting advisory group members Lloyd S. Guerci and Meredith Hemphill, Jr. as stating that
“courts should not be required to apply vastly different rules for different areas of the law unless
there are compelling reasons. . . . [Yet, the advisory group] has suggested a separate and
significantly different chapter in the Guidelines for environmental offenses, without a
demonstrated need”); see also Jed S. Rakoff, The Ideology of Environmental Sentencing Guidelines,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 9, 1993, at 3 (criticizing the lack of any clear rationale in the Proposed
Guidelines for applying the fine formula based on statutory maximums). But see Robert L.
Kracht, Comment, A Critical Analysis of the Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations
Convicted of Environmental Crimes, 40 VILL. L. REV. 513, 536 (1995) (“It is evident that the
Proposed Guidelines borrowed extensively from the Organizational Guidelines for its
definitional sections and, occasionally, its operational sections.”). As a matter of fact, the
Proposed Guidelines are identical in structure, wording, and Base Offense Level assignment to
Chapter Two of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Offenses Involving the Environment) except
for the section on Wildlife Endangerment. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
2Q, with PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9B2.1, reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, supra
note 111, at 1379-80.
123. See PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9E1.1 n.1, reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines,
supra note 111, at 1384 (noting division “over the precise percentages of the statutory maximum
fine to correspond to particular offense levels”); id. § 9E1.2(b) n.2, reprinted in Draft Corporate
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 111, at 1384 (noting division “over the precise percentage
limitation on mitigation credit for violations other than knowing endangerment violations”);
§ 9F1.1(a)(5) n.4, reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 111, at 1385
(noting division “over the mandatory use of probation for organizations with prior civil or
administrative adjudications”); see also Reject Draft, supra note 121, at D7 (reporting certain
Advisory Group members’ opposition to the Proposed Guidelines).
124. See Interview with Michael S. Gelacak, Commissioner, Vice-Chairman of the United
States Sentencing Commission, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 19, 1998) [hereinafter Interview];
BENEDICT S. COHEN, NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, CORPORATIONS AND
THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME 8 (1993) (noting that the Advisory
Group conducted its deliberations behind closed doors and imposed a vow of silence on its
members).
125. For example, none of the provisions regarding sentences for violations of wildlife
regulations was ever completed. See PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9, reprinted in Draft Corporate
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 111, at 1378.

revision, they nevertheless provide sound principles to ensure that
offending organizations are fined appropriately, consistently, and in
proportion to the gravity of their crime. Arguments critical of the
Proposed Guidelines generally focus on the technical features rather
than the principles of the Proposed Guidelines.126 As argued in this
section, however, such criticisms in no way diminish the need to
implement fine guidelines for organizational environmental crime.
A. Sentencing Solutions Exist
This section examines how the Proposed Guidelines resolve the
four issues raised by the Commission as barriers to applying the
Organizational Guidelines to environmental crime. By illustrating
the sui generis nature of organizational environmental crime, the
Proposed Guidelines show why organizational environmental crime
requires separate treatment in the Guidelines from other types of
organizational crime.
1.

Scaling fines to the statutory maximum
As discussed above, fines for environmental offenses are difficult to
determine because the pecuniary gain or loss may not adequately
reflect the gravity of the offense or may be too difficult to estimate.127
Partly due to this inadequacy, the Advisory Group adopted a
materially different methodology to determine fines.128 By basing
fines upon an Offense Table tied to statutory maximums,129 the
Proposed Guidelines are able to establish appropriate fines for
serious environmental crimes where the pecuniary gains or losses
cannot be readily determined.130 Though the Proposed Guidelines
aim to impose significant fines on organizational offenders, they also
seek to limit the disparate and unfair impact of “overcharging” or
“undercharging” organizations that commit the same offense.131
126. See Don J. Debenedictis, Few Like Pollution Guidelines: Business “Up in Arms” over Proposed
Fines for Corporate Environmental Crimes, A.B.A. J., June 1993, at 25 (quoting then-Commissioner
Ilene Nagel as unimpressed with “canned comments” critical of proposed guidelines since
guidelines were left incomplete).
127. See supra discussion Part II.A (discussing the difficulties in calculating Base Fines for
environmental crimes).
128. See Mushal, supra note 89, at 206 (discussing the deficiencies of Chapter Eight that led
to the promulgation of the Proposed Guidelines).
129. See supra discussion Part III.A (discussing the calculation of fines under the Proposed
Guidelines); infra app. C.
130. See Mushal, supra note 89, at 207.
131. The Proposed Guidelines “strike a balance between possible ‘over-charging’ and
potentially huge discounts for multiple crimes” by utilizing a formula of decreasing returns. See
id. If, for example, a particular offense occurs repeatedly over a substantial period of time, a
prosecutor may potentially bring many, perhaps hundreds, of distinct charges for violating the
applicable regulation. This, of course, would expose the offender to potentially millions of

Thus, by anchoring the determination of fines to percentages of
statutory maximums, the Proposed Guidelines are able to balance the
need for imposing adequate fines for environmental offenses without
also exposing an organizational offender to absurdly large and unjust
fines.
2.

Using “reactive fault” as a measure of culpability
Despite assertions to the contrary,132 the Proposed Guidelines
actually do take into account an organization’s culpability albeit, in a
non-traditional way. Although organization liability traditionally has
focused upon acts of the corporate entity at the time of, or just prior
to, the criminal conduct,133 Professors Brent Fisse and John
Braithwaite have argued that an organization’s culpability can be
measured by the organization’s efforts to remedy its offense.134 By
imputing organizational culpability retroactively, a determination of
whether an organization undertook “satisfactory preventive or
corrective measures in response to the commission of the actus reus of
an offence [sic]” may be used to mitigate its sentence.135
Such an imputation of “reactive fault” is present in the Proposed
Guidelines with respect to the evaluation of compliance programs.136

dollars in criminal fines even if fined relatively lightly for each violation. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(d)(7)(B) (1994) (stating that offenses involving the transportation of hazardous
materials may bring a fine of up to $50,000 per day of violation). Assuming that the applicable
statutory maximum was $500,000 and the offender was convicted of 100 counts of the offense, if
the court determined that each offense warranted a fine equivalent to 10% of the statutory
maximum, i.e., simple recordkeeping offenses, see PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9B2.1(a)(3),
reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 111, at 1379; infra app. C, then each
count would bring a fine of $50,000. Multiplied by 100 counts, the offender would be fined $5
million, arguably an absurd amount for relatively innocuous offenses.
To prevent such “count-stacking”, the Advisory Group incorporated section 9E1.2 (“General
Limitations”). See Devine, supra note 122, at 261; see also PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9E1.2,
reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 111, at 1384. According to that
section, “[i]f the court finds that the total fine calculated . . . would be unjust as a result of
excessive repetition of counts relating to a course of offense behavior that is on going or
continuous in nature,” the court is to multiply the fine amount for each successive count at 1/n
of its total where “n” is the number for that count of conviction. See id. § 9E1.2, reprinted in Draft
Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 111, at 1384. In the above example, therefore, where
the first count of conviction would bring a fine of $50,000, the second would only bring a fine
of $25,000 ($50,000 multiplied by 1/2), and the third just $16,667 ($50,000 multiplied by 1/3),
and so on. Thus, rather than facing a $5 million fine, the offender in our example would
receive a fine of just $259,368.88, or just over 5% of what could have otherwise been imposed.
For repeated minor offenses, this greatly reduced fine is intuitively more just, but still high
enough to reflect the seriousness of the large amount of offenses.
132. See Lemkin, supra note 96, at 338 (arguing that the Proposed Guidelines fail to account
for scienter).
133. BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY 47
(1993).
134. See id. at 48.
135. See id. (emphasis added).
136. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing the nature and mitigating effect

As a result, factoring in the presence of compliance programs as a
mitigating factor will motivate corporations to ensure that they have
effective and comprehensive compliance programs in place prior to
any possible prosecution.137 Not only will such programs reduce an
organization’s risk of prosecution138 but they can also reduce an
organization’s exposure to substantial criminal fines for violating an
environmental regulation,139 especially in instances where the
organization lacks a compliance program of any kind.140 Thus, the
problem of determining culpability for strict liability environmental
offenses may be solved via the implementation of Guidelines that
evaluate the reactive fault of an organization.
3.

Managing overlapping enforcement
The issue of overlapping enforcement programs is specifically

compliance programs have on sentences and their emphasis on both proactive compliance, as
well as qualifying remedial measures).
137. See Greg Baldwin & John Campbell, Sentencing Rules Point Way to Organizational
Salvation, 6 MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Jan. 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8353413 (“The
guidelines provide major opportunities [to organizations] to reduce sharply their exposure to
criminal fines by taking advance measures to prevent, detect and report violations of federal
law.”).
138. Few corporations, regardless of offense conduct, have received credit for their
compliance programs under the Organizational Guidelines. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, ORGANIZATIONAL DEFENDANTS DATAFILE, 1991-97 (noting that of the 708
organizations sentenced under the Guidelines, only 35 had compliance programs at the time of
sentencing and only two received credit for having qualifying compliance programs)
[hereinafter DATAFILE]; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (allowing a
three-point deduction for organizations that demonstrate an effective compliance program at
or before the occurrence of the offense). This phenomena, however, does not necessarily
indicate that courts are unwilling to give such credit. Instead, that fact may simply indicate that
the government has chosen or agreed not to prosecute criminally organizations that
demonstrate the presence of an effective compliance program. See Interview with Amy L.
Schreiber, Staff Attorney, Office of General Counsel of the United States Sentencing
Commission, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 19, 1998).
139. Under the current Organizational Guidelines, fines increase both incrementally and
proportionately as the offense level increases. For example, an Offense Level Nine fine is
$10,000 more than an Offense Level Six fine, whereas an Offense Level 29 fine is $4,400,000
greater than an Offense Level 26 fine. See infra app. A. Consequently, the greater the Offense
Level, the more “valuable” the three-point deduction becomes for having an effective
compliance program. For example, a three-point deduction for having a compliance program
is worth $10,000 to those defendants convicted of a level nine offense, but the same deduction
is worth $4,400,000 for defendants convicted of a level 29 offense.
Under the Proposed Guidelines, it is possible to receive up to an eight-level reduction for
having demonstrated prior implementation and utilization of an effective compliance program.
See PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9C1.2(a), reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, supra note
111, at 1381-82. For example, assuming a base Offense Level of 20, an eight-point reduction
could reduce the sentence from 90% of a statutory maximum fine, to just 45%. See id. §
9E1.2(b), supra note 111, at 1384 (noting a 50% fine reduction basement).
140. See PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9C1.1(f), reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines,
supra note 111, at 1381 (increasing the Offense Level by four levels in the absence of an
effective and otherwise qualifying compliance program).

addressed in section 9-2.031 of the United States Attorneys Manual.141
Known as the Petite Policy,142 it is the practice of the United States not
to prosecute a case if all federal interests have been vindicated
through a state prosecution.143 This practice reflects the federal
government’s desire to conserve resources and minimize
prosecutorial redundancy where possible.144 Thus, it is reasonable to
expect that the Petite Policy would ensure that federal interests are
always vindicated regardless of who ultimately prosecutes an
environmental offender.145
Nevertheless, if it was the understanding of the Commission that
the bulk of organizational environmental crime would continue to be
prosecuted predominately at the state level, and not at the federal
level,146 this assumption must now be reevaluated. In violation of the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) voluntary disclosure
policy,147 many states are now granting immunity privileges to
organizations that voluntarily disclose environmental violations
during the course of self-audits.148 Because such this actions may
141. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-2.031 (1998) [hereinafter USAM 1998]
(noting that although there is no statutory bar to federal prosecution subsequent to state
prosecution of a defendant for the same crime, “Congress expressly has provided that, as to
certain offenses, a state judgment of conviction or acquittal . . . shall be a bar to any subsequent
federal prosecution for the same act or acts.”) (citing, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. §§ 659, 660, 1992,
2101, 2117 (1994)).
142. See USAM 1998, supra note 141, § 9-2.031 (citing Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529
(1960), as the common-law source of dual and successive prosecution policy).
143. See id. (“The purpose of this policy is to vindicate substantial federal interests through
appropriate federal prosecutions, . . . to promote efficient utilization of Department resources,
and to promote coordination and cooperation between federal and state prosecutors.”);
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS MANUAL § 5-11.113 (1997) [hereinafter USAM 1997] (reiterating
the applicability of the Petite Policy specifically for the federal prosecution of environmental
offenses).
144. See USAM 1998, supra note 141, § 9-2.031.
145. See EPA’s and States’ Efforts to Focus State Enforcement Programs on Results: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 3-4
(1998) (statement of Michael Gryszkowiec, Director of Planning and Reporting Resources,
Community, and Economic Development Division) (observing that “[a]s a condition of
accepting responsibility for implementing the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, and other
environmental statutes, delegated states must establish enforcement programs approved by
EPA” to ensure proper compliance by regulated communities and noting that failure by a
delegated state to ensure that regulated communities comply with pollution discharge
limitations may result in EPA withdrawal of state’s approved status).
146. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
147. Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, Director of the Office of Criminal Enforcement
Forensics and Training to All EPA Employees Working in or in Support of the Criminal
Enforcement Prog. 4 (Oct. 1, 1997) <http://es.epa.gov/oeca/oceft/audpol2.html> (noting
that EPA’s voluntary disclosure policy does not create any rights or benefits enforceable at law
in terms of EPA’s discretion to prosecute in light of voluntary disclosure).
148. See Cheryl Hogue, Enforcement: EPA Policy in 1997 Expected to Reflect Evolution of
Reinvention Efforts, DAILY ENV’T REP., Jan. 21, 1997, at G2 (reporting that about 20 states grant
immunity for violations discovered during self-audits). Since this practice conflicts with EPA
policy, see id., the EPA may begin to withdraw its delegation of responsibility to enforce federal

leave federal interests unvindicated, federal proceedings may be
warranted in those instances.149
Already it is evident that both the EPA150 and the Environment and
Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice have stepped
up their enforcement efforts.151 This increase is reflected by the fact
that organizational environmental crime currently makes up the
second-largest group of organizational crime, second only to fraud.152
Moreover, organizational environmental crime now constitutes nearly
twenty percent of all organizational crime.153 The Commission,
environmental regulations to states that observe such self-audit privileges and begin to
prosecute those cases. See Hogue, supra, at G-2 (reporting on the possible showdown between
the states and the EPA with regard to state grants of immunity to information obtained during a
self-audit); see also, USAM 1998, supra note 141, § 9-2.031 (describing the Petite policy, which
requires federal prosecution of defendants already prosecuted at the state level if there exists
any unvindicated federal interest). But see Russell Mokhiber, “Objective” Science at Auction,
ECOLOGIST, Mar. 13, 1998, at 57 (reporting that “[t]he US chemical industry has ‘overpowered’
federal and state efforts to protect the public health from chemical hazards” through improper
“revolving door” lobbying of EPA officials by former federal officials, thus suggesting
widespread interference with the prosecutorial efforts of the EPA).
149. See USAM 1997, supra note 143, § 511.113 (C).
150. According to statistics compiled by the United States Sentencing Commission and
published in its Annual Report for the years 1993 to 1997, there were only 5 federal convictions
for organizational environmental crime reported by the federal courts in 1993, but 14 in 1994,
20 in 1995, 22 in 1996, 44 in 1997. See 1993 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 174; 1994 U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 131; 1995 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 126-28; 1996
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 69; 1997 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 95. As of
this writing, the data for fiscal year 1998 have not yet been published. Moreover, as the EPA
becomes more active in its prosecutorial efforts, the likelihood of more federal convictions for
environmental offenses certainly increases. See Bancroft et al., supra note 13, at 184 (reporting
that environmental regulatory violations were the second largest federal offense committed by
organizations for 1997, behind only fraud, accounting for over 20% of all environmental
crime); Samuel R. Miller et al., Sentencing for Environmental Crimes Under Federal Law, C800 A.L.I.A.B.A. 213, 215 (1992) (noting the dramatic increase in enforcement of environmental crimes
from the mid-Eighties to early Nineties and the four-fold increase in the number of EPA
prosecutors subsequent to passage of the Pollution Prosecution Act); Kenneth D. Woodrow, The
Proposed Federal Environmental Sentencing Guidelines: A Model for Corporate Environmental Compliance
Programs, 25 Envtl. Rep. (BNA), at 325 (June 17, 1994) (noting that “corporations have been
subject to growing numbers of criminal prosecutions under environmental statutes”); Traci
Watson, Today’s EPA: You Pollute, We Prosecute, USA TODAY, May 21, 1998, at A5 (reporting on
the unprecedented activity of Environmental Protection Agency agents in investigating criminal
violations of federal environmental regulation violations and on the 300% increase in the
number of investigators hired just since 1990); cf. Judson W. Starr & Thomas J. Kelly Jr.,
Environmental Crimes and the Sentencing Guidelines: The Time Has Come . . . and it is Hard Time, 20
ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,096 (March 1990) (noting the increased importance of
criminal prosecution for the federal government’s environmental enforcement strategy); Leon,
supra note 120, at 679 (“You do not need a weatherman to see the ominous cloud of criminal
enforcement [of environmental regulations] mushrooming on the near horizon.”).
151. See Department of Justice, Envt. Div. Highlights, Accomplishments, Initiatives: Enforcing Laws
Means Protecting Public Health, Promoting Economic Development, D.O.J.-ENR PRESS RELEASE, Aug. 6,
1998 (reporting that 1997 was “one of the most successful years ever for enforcement of our
nation’s environmental laws”).
152. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
95 (1997) (reporting that for fiscal year 1997 there were 45 organizational environmental
discharge offenses and 91 fraud offenses) [hereinafter USSC SOURCEBOOK].
153. Of the 222 organizational cases for fiscal year 1997, 44 were environmental “waste

furthermore, has seen the amount of organizational environmental
crime jump from just five cases in 1993,154 to forty-four in 1997.155
Given the Department of Justice’s increased enforcement efforts, the
Commission can expect that this trend will continue and that
organizational environmental crime will also continue to constitute a
significant portion of organizational crime. Accordingly, it is clear
that overlapping enforcement no longer serves as a buffer between
state and federal prosecution. Therefore, the Commission ought to
prepare for the increasing presence of organizational environmental
crime within the United States district courts by implementing
appropriate guidelines.
4.

The limits of cost-benefit analysis in regard to public policy
Cost-benefit analyses, though “an appropriate guide to moral
choice”156 for many of our decisions, may not always be the best guide,
especially when determining an appropriate sentencing structure for
organizational environmental crime. The problem with utilizing a
cost-benefit methodology to determine whether or not to adopt a
sentencing policy for environmental regulatory offenses is that it
requires “all costs and benefits to be expressed in a common metric,
typically dollars.”157 This requirement creates an immediate problem:
how does one place a dollar-value “on things not normally bought
and sold on markets?”158 To re-cast the examples first mentioned in
this Comment, what might the dollar-value be for the public’s loss of
millions of fish from the Prince William Sound, or for the loss of use
of a popular beach in Puerto Rico? Is the answer that such disasters
are simply the price we must be willing to pay for the oil we use?
The “willingness to pay”159 response is inadequate on at least two
counts. First, it does not account for the differences in preference
that people may have for a particular commodity, such as a beach.160
Second, the response does not differentiate between the behavior of

discharge” offenses, thus comprising nearly 20% of all organizational offenses.
154. See 1993 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 17 (reporting that organizational
environmental discharge cases constituted five of 50 total organizational offenses, or 10% of all
organizational cases).
155. See USSC SOURCEBOOK, supra note 152, at 95 (reporting 45 organizational
environmental discharge cases, but erroneously including one organizational wildlife case).
156. Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental, Safety, and Health Regulation:
Ethical and Philosophical Considerations, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS: POLITICS, ETHICS, AND METHODS 137, 138 (Daniel Swartzman et al. eds., 1982).
157. See id. at 143.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 143-44 (discussing “willingness to pay” as equivalent to a cost-benefit analysis).
160. See id. at 143.

consumers in private markets and public policy decisions.161 It may
very well be the case that collectively, the public “give[s] certain
things a higher valuation” than would be given to those same things
in “private, individual activities.”162 That is, where a cost-benefit
analysis model may succeed at the private level, it may not at the
public level.163 Thus, arguments against adopting the Proposed
Guidelines due to potential increased costs to organizations and their
consumers within a private market may ultimately fail as a matter of
public policy. In fact, it appears that they do.
B. The Proposed Guidelines Offer an Equitable Sentencing Structure
The main criticism against implementing the Proposed Guidelines
was that they would “over-deter” businesses or cause them to “overcomply” with environmental regulations.164
According to such
arguments, businesses would be fined too severely for environmental
crimes,165 and would, therefore, allocate far too many resources to
reduce their exposure,166 or merely “pass the costs of fines onto
161. See id. at 145.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 146 (“[T]he use of private behavior to impute values for public decisions
violates a view of citizen behavior that is deeply engrained in our democratic tradition.”). For
example, the fact that individuals tend to engage in risky behavior indicates that life is not
infinitely valued, and therefore public policy ought to reflect such a finite valuation of human
life. See id. at 145. An alternative interpretation is that public policy influences private behavior
by establishing an ideal. See id. at 146. The implementation of stricter health regulations, for
example, might promote a “reverence for life” that might otherwise be lacking in an
individual’s private life. See id. Likewise, although we may not be willing to pay privately the
costs of environmental regulation and enforcement, we may be so inclined from a public policy
perspective where the costs are widely distributed.
164. See Lemkin, supra note 96, at 309 (arguing that the Proposed Guidelines’ focus on
retribution is misplaced, and that instead, the goal of sentencing should be deterrence); see also
supra discussion Part III.B (discussing why the Proposed Guidelines were not adopted). Such
an argument, however, is not germane to the Proposed Guidelines, but is rather directed
against the possibility of increased fines. It is the same argument that was used against the
Organizational Guidelines when they were first promulgated. See Martin Harrell, Organizational
Environmental Crime and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: Combining Fines with Restitution,
Remedial Orders, Community Service, and Probation to Benefit the Environment While Punishing the
Guilty, 6 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 243, 266 n.136 (1995) (“When the Advisory Group put out its initial
draft [of the Proposed Guidelines] for public comment, the same forces which had opposed
the [Organizational Guidelines] as being too intrusive on business decision making and
providing for overly punitive fines banded together again.”).
165. See Reject Draft, supra note 121, at D7 (reporting the claim of two Advisory Group
members that the Proposed Guidelines would impose excessive fines that “would be close to the
statutory maximum and would be significantly higher than fines calculated using the existing
[Organizational Guidelines]”); Enforcement: Low Marks Given to Draft Guidelines for Sentencing
Envtl. Violators, DAILY ENV’T REP., May 5, 1993, at D3 (reporting widespread fear among
corporate attorneys and representatives that the Proposed Guidelines would result in “excessive
punishment” and “exorbitant fines that . . . were out of proportion to the nature of
environmental crimes”).
166. See Lemkin, supra note 96, at 344 (“Overpunishment and overdeterrence, used to
control crime, can lead to gross inefficiency, . . . [may] unnecessarily harm the organization, . . .

stockholders and consumers.”167 Thus, if it turns out that courts are
currently imposing adequate fines and ordering the implementation
of compliance programs when warranted,168 the Commission should
leave well enough alone.169 Still, the question remains whether the
sentencing structure of the Proposed Guidelines would in fact overdeter businesses.
According to data compiled by the United States Sentencing
Commission, since October 1, 1991, 107 organizations have been
federally convicted of violating various environmental discharge
statutes.170 Because the Proposed Guidelines’ Fine Table is driven by
percentages of statutory maximums,171 determining what percentage
of a given statutory maximum courts are now imposing will give
substantial insight into how the Proposed Guidelines might affect
courts’ sentencing practices. Of the 107 cases, 94 resulted in the
imposition of fines.172 Consequently, the following analysis is limited
to those 94 cases.
The first step in assessing the potential impact the Proposed
Guidelines might have on the imposition of fines is to determine
what the statutory maximums were in each case. For example, in a
case involving one count for a “knowing” violation of section
1319(c)(2) of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), the statutory maximum
fine would be $50,000 per day of violation.173 According to 18 U.S.C.
and the economy, . . . [and may further] cause organizations to refrain from engaging in lawful
behavior for fear of crossing the line.”).
167. See Harrell, supra note 164, at 264 (stating that this is the “corporate reformist” theory
which advocates “more frequent imposition of probation and other non-monetary sanctions”
instead of fines); Lemkin, supra note 96, at 342 (arguing that “any punishment” of corporations
for environmental violations in terms of fines inevitably “falls on consumers”).
168. According to organizational case-files reviewed by the author, only 40% of all
organizations sentenced for environmental violations from 1991 until 1997 have been ordered
to, or otherwise implemented, compliance programs.
169. See Starr & Braker, supra note 32, at 26 (“[A]s recent corporate plea agreements and
sentences show, courts currently are able to impose significant fines against corporations and
are able to ensure that corporate violators literally clean up their act. The present system’s
successes should be considered in the continuing debate over fine guidelines for organizational
environmental violators.”).
170. See DATAFILE, supra note 138.
171. See infra app. C.
172. See DATAFILE, supra note 138. Of the thirteen cases resulting in no fine, nine were due
to the organization’s inability to pay the fine. See id. The reasons why the other four received
no fine could not be determined. See id.
173. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (C)(2) (1994) (stating that a fine can not be lower than $5,000 for
a knowing violation). Though “knowing” violations may bring up to a $500,000 fine, for most
environmental offenses, if a corporation is convicted of knowingly endangering another, the
statutory maximum is $1,000,000. See id. § 1319(c)(3)(A). According to Commission data,
however, only one organization has been convicted under the “knowing endangerment”
provision. See DATAFILE, supra note 138. For negligent or misdemeanor violations that do not
result in death, the statutory maximum is $2,500 to $25,000 per day of violation, see id.
§ 1319(c)(1)(A) (1994), or $200,000, see 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1994), whichever is greater.

§ 3571, however, the court may fine the greater of (1) the amount
specified in the relevant statute, (2) twice the pecuniary gain, (3)
twice the pecuniary loss, or (4) $500,000 for a felony.174 As previously
noted, because determining pecuniary gain or loss is generally too
difficult to ascertain in an environmental case,175 establishing the
statutory maximum based upon such gains or losses is almost never
utilized for sentencing purposes.176 Likewise, insofar as most CWA
violations are one-day occurrences,177 the statutory provision that
limits the fine to $50,000 per day is rarely used because it is not the
greatest of the four possible statutory maximums.178 Instead, the
$500,000 provision, being the greatest of all the possible statutorily
maximum fines, is nearly always used as the statutory maximum.179
The second step—based upon the fine actually imposed—is to
ascertain under what Offense Level these cases would have been
sentenced had the Proposed Guidelines been implemented. Of the
94 cases surveyed, the statutory maximum was determinable in 80 of
those cases.180 The average fine for those 80 cases was equivalent to
20% of the applicable statutory maximum.181 This is equivalent to an
Offense Level of seven, eight, or nine under the Proposed
Guidelines’ Fine Table.182
174. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (c)(1)-(3).
175. See supra discussion Part II.A.
176. Of the 107 corporate environmental cases, this fine provision appears to have been
used only once. In United States v. Bunker Group, involving the grounding of a and subsequent
massive oil spill from the barge Morris J. Berman, the companies involved were each found guilty
of violating one count of the CWA under a negligence provision. See Three Corporations Fined,
supra note 1, at 1 (discussing the circumstances of the Bunker Group). That provision carries a
statutory maximum of only $25,000 per day. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c) (1). Consequently, the
court utilized the alternative fine provision of Title 18. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (d) (stating that “if
the offense results in pecuniary loss to a [third-party], the defendant may be fined not more
than. . . twice the gross loss”). It was reported that the clean-up costs reached $90 million. See
Three Corporations Fined, supra note 1, at 1. Assuming the court designated that amount as the
pecuniary loss, then under Title 18, the statutory maximum penalty would have been $180
million.
177. Of the 107 organizational cases, 67 resulted in one-count convictions of violating the
applicable statutory regulation on a particular day. See DATAFILE, supra note 138.
178. This, of course, is because any violation occurring for a period of less than 10 days will
set the fine maximum at an amount less than $500,000. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c)(2).
179. Generally, “knowing” violations of an environmental regulation carry a fine provision
providing for a $500,000 statutory maximum fine insofar as they are felonies. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3571(c)(3) (setting the statutory maximum fine at $500,000); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)
(imposing a term of imprisonment of not more than three years for violating the applicable
provisions). Of the 107 cases, all but 11 were convictions for knowing violations of
environmental regulations. See DATAFILE, supra note 138.
180. See DATAFILE, supra note 138. The 14 cases excluded from the statutory maximum
analysis either had no statutory maximum fine recorded, or the statutory maximum fine
recorded was less than the fine required: a violation of the statute and therefore incorrect.
181. See id. (reflecting the average percentage of statutory maximums fined at 26.04% for
118 surveyed cases where both a non-null fine and a statutory maximum were recorded).
182. See infra app. C.

The third step is to determine at which Offense Level the surveyed
cases would have been sentenced had the Proposed Guidelines been
implemented. That is, based upon the factual nature of the offense,
what offense level would have resulted? Under the Proposed
Guidelines, a conviction for mishandling hazardous substances results
in the assignment of a Base Offense Level of eight.183 If there
happens to be an actual discharge, a common “specific offense
characteristic”184 among the cases surveyed, the Base Offense Level
increases by four.185 Significantly, should an organization cooperate
with the prosecutor during the investigation by entering a guilty plea
before substantial trial preparation has taken place,186 an action that
organizations appear to undertake in the overwhelming majority of
cases,187 the corporation may qualify for a four-level decrease.188 This
would set the final Offense Level at eight, or just 15% to 25% of the
statutory maximum.189 Since the average fine for fiscal years 1993
through 1998 was 20% of the statutory maximum,190 the courts appear
to be fining organizations much as they would under the Proposed
Guidelines.191
The above analysis, however, does not take into consideration
various aggravating and mitigating factors that could dramatically
change the ultimate Offense Level under which an organization may

183. See PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9B2.1(b)(2)(A), reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing
Guidelines, supra note 111, at 1379.
184. Specific offense characteristics pertain to the factual nature surrounding the offense,
i.e., whether there was an ongoing and continuous release of toxic waste into a stream, whether
the offense substantially increased the likelihood of another person becoming injured. See
generally id. § 9B2.1(b)(2)(B), reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 111, at
1379 (explaining the various offense level increases and decreases associated with specific
offense characteristics).
185. See id. § 9B2.1(b)(2)(B)(i)(b), reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, supra
note 111, at 1379.
186. See id. § 9C1.2(b) cmt., reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 111, at
1381-82 (noting that to “fully cooperate” means that the organization must provide “all
pertinent information known to or ascertainable by it that would assist law enforcement
personnel in identifying the nature and extent of the offense”).
187. Between 1991 and 1997, 86 of 107 organizational convictions for environmental
offenses were the result of plea agreements. See DATAFILE, supra note 138. Seventy of the 80
surveyed cases were also the result of plea agreements. See id.
188. See PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9C1.2(b)(2), reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing
Guidelines, supra note 111, at 1382.
189. See infra app. C.
190. See DATAFILE, supra note 138 (stating that the average is 20% of statutory maximum).
191. Interestingly, for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, of 36 cases that received a fine and where
the statutory maximum could be readily ascertained, the average fine represented 25.62% of
the statutory maximum. See DATAFILE, supra note 138. This corresponds to an Offense Level of
10. See infra app. C. Thus, it seems that for at least the past two years, organizations may
actually have been fined higher than they otherwise would be under the Proposed Guidelines.
See id.

be sentenced.192 Unfortunately, from the data that have been
collected by the Commission, it is simply impossible to determine
how courts weigh various aggravating factors—such as management
involvement in the offense, and mitigating factors—such as the
presence of a compliance program.193 Still, given that the Proposed
Guidelines allow for a three to eight-level reduction for organizations
that demonstrate the presence of compliance programs prior to the
offense,194 an Offense Level of twelve could be reduced to an Offense
Level of nine or even, theoretically, to four.195 Even assuming a
finding of management involvement, which would increase the
Offense Level by six196 for a total of eighteen, the presence of a
compliance program could still reduce the Offense Level to fifteen,
or even ten, i.e., about the level at which courts are now sentencing.
Thus, there are no a priori reasons to believe that if the Proposed
192. See generally PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9C1.1-.2, reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing
Guidelines, supra note 111, at 1381-82.
193. Under the current sentencing scheme, because the court is not required to consider
formally such factors as information about how, if at all, a particular court weighed the
presence of management involvement and the presence of a compliance program in
determining an organization’s fine, this information is not noted in the judgement-andconviction orders or in the pre-sentence reports. Consequently, there is no way to ascertain
how such factors currently influence the decision-making processes of the courts in
determining fines.
194. See PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9C1.2(a), reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines,
supra note 111, at 1381-82; see also supra note 111 (discussing the mitigating effect of compliance
programs).
195. See generally PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9C1.2(a), reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing
Guidelines, supra note 111, at 1381-82 (stating that a prior compliance program can reduce the
offense level by three to eight levels). To be sure, however, such a reduction is limited to 50%
of the amount determined after all aggravating factors have been considered. See id.
§ 9E1.2(b), reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 111, at 1384. If, for
example, a corporation is convicted of mishandling hazardous substances, the Base Offense
Level is set at eight. See id. § 9B2.1(b)(2)(A), reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines,
supra note 111, at 1379. If it were also determined that the offense constituted an ongoing,
continuous, or repetitive discharge of hazardous material, the Base Offense Level is increased
by six to 14. See id. § 9B2.1(b)(2)(B)(i)(a), reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, supra
note 111, at 1379. An Offense Level of 14 corresponds with a fine range of 40% to 60% of the
statutory maximum. See infra app. C. Assuming that the statutory maximum is $500,000, this
would give the court the discretion to fine the corporation from $200,000 to $300,000.
Assuming further that the court initially set the fine at $250,000, if the court determined that
the corporation had a qualifying compliance program in place prior to the offense, it could
reduce the Offense Level from 14 to six. See PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9C1.2(a), reprinted in Draft
Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 111, at 1381-82 (allowing an Offense Level reduction
of three to eight levels for organizations that demonstrate commitment to qualifying
compliance program). An Offense Level of six corresponds to a fine of 10% of the statutory
maximum, or $50,000. See infra app. C. But as noted above, the court would be prevented by
section 9E1.2(b) from reducing the fine to this amount since it would constitute more than a
50% reduction. See PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9E1.2(b), reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing
Guidelines, supra note 111, at 1384. At most, the court would be able to reduce the fine to
$125,000—a de facto Offense Level of eight—even though it would otherwise be permitted to
reduce the Offense Level to six.
196. See PROPOSED GUIDELINES § 9C1.1(a), reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines,
supra note 111, at 1380.

Guidelines are implemented they would “dramatically increase the
level of fines imposed upon corporations convicted of environmental
crimes.”197 Instead, even allowing for various aggravating factors, it is
still quite possible that the average fine for organizational
environmental crime would not significantly increase under a
statutory maximum-based sentencing structure provided that
organizations implement effective compliance programs.
In light of this finding, one might still question the need for
guidelines inasmuch as, according to the previous analysis, the
average fine amount would likely not change. That is, if the courts
are currently sentencing on average much as they would under the
Proposed Guidelines, are the Proposed Guidelines even needed?198
To answer this, it is important to understand that focusing upon an
“average fine” may not reveal important information about the
distribution of the fines for organizational offenses.199 After all, the
Guidelines are not so much concerned with the average fine, but
ensuring that similarly situated offenders who commit substantially
the same offense are fined in a like manner.200 Consequently,
inasmuch as the Guidelines are designed to take such factors into
account,201 one would expect that the resultant fines for similarly
197. Starr & Braker, supra note 32, at 26.
198. It is questionable how much weight the Commission should give to past sentencing
practices in terms of the average fine imposed. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISSENTING VIEW OF
COMMISSIONER PAUL H. ROBINSON ON THE PROMULGATION OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES BY THE
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 4 (1987) (arguing that basing sentences on
mathematical averages is "irrational” insofar as the average likely will not reflect any actual
sentencing disparity that may have been the result of different, but consistent, sentencing
philosophies). But see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(3) (1998) (stating that
the “Commission did not simply copy estimates of pre-guidelines practice as revealed by the
data, even though establishing offense values on this basis would help eliminate disparity because
the data represent averages”) (emphasis added). Thus, the average fine may not necessarily be
either an appropriate or an accurate basis for promulgating a sentencing guideline. As a result,
adoption of the proposed guidelines ought not turn on whether or not they differ from past
sentencing practices. See, e.g., id. (stating that the Commission departed from past sentencing
practices where statutes required such departures or where, as was the case for economic
crimes, past sentencing practices appeared to be too lenient when compared with other
equivalent behavior).
199. For example, if on one hand two organizations are convicted of similar environmental
offenses and one is fined 20% of the statutory maximum, and the other 80% of the statutory
maximum, the average of the two fines would be equivalent to 50% of the statutory maximum.
If, on the other hand, one organization is fined 45% of the statutory maximum and the other
55%, the average fine would still be equivalent to 50% of the statutory maximum. The latter set
of fines, however, is far less dispersed than the former set. See MORRIS HAMBURG, BASIC
STATISTICS: A MODERN APPROACH 75 (3d ed. 1985) (noting how averages do not reflect the
dispersion of the data).
200. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A (discussing the
Commission’s goal of remedying unwarranted disparity in sentencing while recognizing that not
all such disparity is unwarranted).
201. See id. ch. 1, pt. A(3), policy statement (discussing the Commission’s consideration of
both the offender and the offense when it formulated the Guidelines).

situated offenders convicted of similar offenses and sentenced under
a guideline would approximately be of the same general amount, i.e.,
close to the average fine amount. If, however, there are no
sentencing guidelines for a particular offense, it would not be
surprising to discover an element of randomness in the amount of
fines imposed upon convicted organizations. In other words, for
offenses where the guidelines do not apply, one would expect the
fine distribution for those offenses to be somewhat similar to the fine
distribution in the pre-Guidelines era.202
Figure 1

As it turns out, data analyzed from the Commission’s
Organizational Defendants Datafile203 lend support to the above
hypothesis. The above figure notes the relative distribution of
organizational fines relative to the average fine. For example, over
202. See Swenson, supra note 83, at 30 (discussing the results of the Commission’s research
that revealed that in the pre-Guidelines era “[c]orporate sentencing was in disarray” such that
“nearly identical cases were treated differently”).
203. See DATAFILE, supra note 138. The data for Figure 1 analyze only those cases wherein
some non-null fine was imposed and where the Commission’s datafile recorded a statutory
maximum for the case. Fraud and antitrust cases were included inasmuch as they constitute the
largest and third largest offense categories for organizational offenses. See id.

90% of all organizational fines fell within one-third of one standard
deviation of the average fine.204 Similarly, nearly all the fines for
organizational antitrust, fraud, and environmental offenses fell within
one-third of one standard deviation from the average. A closer look
at each category, however, reveals an interesting result. For
environmental offenses, only 17.02% of the fines fell within one-fifth
of one standard deviation, whereas for other offenses, two to five
times as many fines fell within that distribution range. Moreover, the
number of organizational environmental fines that fell within onefifth of one standard deviation turns out to be very close to the
number of fines one would expect to fall in that range for a random
distribution.205
Thus, according to data compiled by the Commission, fines for
organizational environmental offenses appear to be significantly
more dispersed than fines for any of the other guideline-governed
offense categories and may thus indicate a degree of randomness in
their distribution. Given that all the other categories are significantly
less dispersed, imposing fine guidelines upon organizational
environmental offenses would likely decrease the current fine
distribution for organizational environmental offenses without
increasingly the average amount of fines imposed.
C. The Public Perception of Organizational Environmental Crime:
Substantive Punishment is Deserved
Part of the Commission’s mandate in determining what categories
204. The standard deviation is the “measure of the spread in a set of observations.” See
HAMBURG, supra note 199, at 69. It is useful for “describing how far individual items in a
distribution depart from the mean of the distribution.” See id. at 72. This distance of departure
from the mean can be expressed in terms of a “standard score.” See id. The standard score is
the “number of standard deviations the observation lies below or above the mean.” Id. at 73.
For example, if a set of data has 100 as its mean and 20 as its standard deviation, a value of 80
would constitute a standard score of –1; and 120 a standard score of +1. See id. at 72. For a
particular set of data with a “normal distribution,” approximately 68.3% of all data-points will
fall within a standard score of ±1. See id. at 71-72. However, “as items are dispersed more and
more widely from the mean, the standard deviation becomes larger and larger.” Id. at 69.
Likewise, if the distribution is significantly skewed, i.e., the distribution lacks the symmetry of a
normal distribution, the standard deviation may be similarly affected. See id. at 61-62. As a
result, for significantly skewed distributions, far more data-points may fall within a standard
score of ±1 than in a normal distribution. In fact, the set of fines in each of the offense
categories analyzed in Figure 1 is so heavily skewed that far more than 68.3% of the fines falls
within a standard score of ±1. Consequently, to reveal differences in the distribution of fines
among the various offense categories, one must examine the distribution of fines within smaller
standard scores. Thus, Figure 1 illustrates the percentage of fines for each particular offense
category that fall within a standard score of ±1/3, ±1/5, and ±1/10.
205. Data for the Random category were generated by the author using a commercial
spreadsheet that randomly selected 94 data-points between $9.00 and $25,000,000 reflecting the
minimum and maximum fines imposed upon organizational environmental offenders.

of offenses will be covered by the Guidelines is to take into
consideration “the community view of the gravity of the offense”, and
“the public concern generated by the offense.”206 A recent CBS News
Poll revealed that 53% of Americans believe that the environment
will be in worse condition in the next century than it is now.207
Similarly, a joint ABC News/Washington Post survey revealed that a
majority of Americans saw environmental issues as very important in
the 1998 congressional elections.208 Thus, it is not surprising that 90%
of Americans believe that Congress and the President should make
the protection of the environment either an important or a top
priority.209 It is quite clear that Americans take the issue of the
environment and its protection very seriously, so much so that 68% of
the respondents in one survey felt that “[p]rotection of the
environment should be given priority, even at the risk of curbing
economic growth,”210 and 69% of the respondents in another survey
were willing to pay higher consumer prices if doing so would increase
the efforts of businesses and industry to improve the environment.211
Although willing to shoulder some of the economic burden, it is
206. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (c)(4)-(5) (1994). According to Professor Kathleen F. Brickey, “there
is widespread public support for treating culpable environmental violations as serious crimes.
Once viewed as mere economic/regulatory offenses lacking an element of moral delict,
environmental crimes now provoke moral outrage and prompt demands for severe sanctions and
strict enforcement.” Kathleen F. Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of
Environmental and Criminal Law Theory, 71 TUL. L. REV. 487, 488-89 (1996). In particularly chilling
language, Professor Jonathan Turley embodies that outrage when he defines environmental crime
as:
[a]n especially vicious form of violent offense against society. Representing a narrow
band of individuals and corporations, environmental felons have most of the
characteristics of conventional violent offenders save one: environmental felons
commit crimes that often continue to victimize long after the commission of the
predicate offense. . . . While a robbery is committed in an instant, an environmental
violation can victimize generations through birth defects, immune deficiencies and
countless other physiological reactions. Finally, while some crimes are committed in
the heat of passion or without premeditation, environmental crimes are committed for
only one reason: cold hard cash. The only difference between an environmental
felon and a racketeer is purely cosmetic.
Environmental Crimes Act of 1992: Hearings on H.R. 5305 Before the House Subcomm. on Crime and
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 123-24 (1992) (testimony of Jonathan
Turley Professor of Law at George Washington University National Law Center).
207. See CBS News Poll, Question ID: USCBS.040698 R49, Apr. 6, 1998, available in WL POLL
(reporting a national telephonic survey of 782 adults).
208. See ABC News/Washington Post Poll, Question ID: USABCWP.071498 22L, July, 14, 1998,
available in WL POLL (noting that 20% of those who felt the environment was a very important
issue also felt that it would be a deciding factor for them in the election).
209. See Princeton Survey Research Associates, Question ID: USPSRA.012398 R09NF2, Jan. 23,
1998, available in WL POLL (surveying 1218 adults by telephone).
210. Gallup Poll, Question ID: USGALLUP.98AP17 R43, Apr. 17, 1998, available in WL
POLL (reporting a national telephonic interview of 1007 adult Americans) (emphasis added).
211. See Cambridge Reports National Omnibus Survey, Question ID: USCAMREP.92JUL R06,
July, 1992, available in WL POLL (reporting the results of a national telephonic survey of 1250
adults).

nevertheless clear that the majority of Americans feel that businesses
should pay for environmental clean-up.212 What is more, most
Americans feel that corporations found responsible for polluting the
environment should be punished through the imposition of fines
even larger than those they are currently receiving.213
Such sentiment exemplifies the Kantian retributivist principle of
jus talionis,214 commonly known as the principle of “just desert.” Just
desert is the ethical precept dictating that an agent should receive the
punishment that it, by its act deserves, independent of other
considerations.215 Although not blind to economic consequences, the
principle of just desert is concerned mainly with the moral imperative
of ensuring that offenders receive their just punishment.216 Inasmuch
as criminal sanctions are supposed to attach a stigma of wrongdoing

212. See Cambridge Reports National Omnibus Survey, Question ID: USCAMREP.92JUL R11,
July, 1992, available in WL POLL (reporting that 52% of 1250 adults surveyed felt that “[m]oney
for environmental clean-up programs should come from special fees paid by business and
government organizations that engage in activities perceived to harm the environment”).
213. See Great American TV Poll Survey #7, Question ID: USPSRA.91TV07 R06, March, 1991,
available in WL POLL (reporting that 61% of 600 adults surveyed felt that the fines and
punishment corporations receive for polluting are not harsh enough while only 5% felt that
they were too harsh).
214. See BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY 45
(1993) (arguing that “[t]he classic interpretation of retribution was . . . social amends for the
evil done” where evil was committed through some breach of self-restraint to be remedied
through punishment. “If we accept that corporations are moral agents” and bear the burden of
self-restraint, “then this form of retribution applies [to them].”); IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 101 (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797)
(arguing that public legal justice adopts as its fundamental principle equality, “the principle of
not treating one side more favorably than the other,” while holding that “[o]nly the Law of
retribution can determine exactly the kind and degree of punishment” one deserves for an
offense committed).
215. This, of course, does not dictate that punishment must always be severe, rather only
that it is adequate to reflect the seriousness of the crime and society’s moral disapprobation of
the activity. See FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 214, at 45. Consequently, it is absurd to state
that “no fine short of complete divestiture can achieve true retribution against an organization.”
See Lemkin, supra note 96, at 341 (stating, without support or argument, that “just punishment”
is to be equated with retribution which, if it is to be had, requires the equivalent of the
corporate death penalty). With such a confused view of the principle of retribution, it is no
surprise that Mr. Lemkin believes that “attempts at exacting retribution from organizations are
misplaced.” Id. at 342.
216. See FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 214, at 45 (noting that retributivist theories of
punishment are centrally concerned with proportioning desert “as a measured way of
expressing the community’s degree of reprobation for a wrongdoer”); see also Kelman, supra
note 156, at 142 (arguing for a deontological ethical approach to environmental regulation
enforcement insofar as moral valuation of any regulation is not necessarily dependent upon
cost-benefit analyses for its validation); H.L. Packer, Justification for Criminal Punishment, in THE
LIMITS OF CRIMINAL SANCTION 35, 37 (1968) (“Retribution rests on the idea that it is right for
the wicked to be punished: because man is responsible for his actions, he ought to receive his
just deserts.”) (cited in Sharp, supra note 40, at n.4). For a contemporary example of such a
theory, see generally Thomas Nagel, Justice and Nature, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (1997) (arguing
for an account of justice that allows for social arrangements that might not be optimal on the
basis of cost-benefit calculations).

upon the offender that differs from civil penalties,217 it is important
that sentencing guidelines are structured in such a way that this
aspect of the criminal sanction is not lost.218
Even if the
implementation of organizational fine guidelines for environmental
crime is more economically costly to society than it is economically
beneficial,219 from a retributivist perspective the case for them is not
diminished. What the retributivist sentiments reflect in the above
public opinion polls is that the imposition of sentencing guidelines
for organizational environmental crime need not kneel at the foot of
economic efficiency.
Organizations should be punished, and
punished justly, to a degree that adequately reflects the value society
places upon the environment, even if that means valuing the
protection of the environment over the economic interests of
organizations.
CONCLUSION
Despite the failure to adopt the Proposed Guidelines, formerCommissioner Michael Gelacak still believes that there should be fine
guidelines for organizational environmental crime.220 Moreover,
many see the implementation of such guidelines as inevitable.221 As
217. Professor Lucia Silecchia and Mr. Michael Malinowski have argued that “criminal
prosecution of corporations for environmental offenses is a ‘square peg’ in the scheme of
general criminal law” insofar as such prosecutions merely impose additional fines on offenders
but do not add to the stigma or collateral consequences that may otherwise be obtained
through civil punitive damages. See Silecchia & Malinowski, supra note 111, at 232. Thus, they
conclude that “[c]riminal prosecution . . . duplicate[s] the civil system.” Id.
218. See Cherif Cordahi, Environment: Polluters Should Face Criminal Prosecution-Lawyers, INTER
PRESS SERV., May 8, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2260940 (reporting on an U.N.-sponsored
environmental conference of international lawyers, some of whom argued that civil sanctions
were insufficient to deter corporations from damaging the environment and that the stigma
associated with criminal convictions was necessary for deterrence); Appeals Court Judge Says
Tough Monetary Penalties Needed for Environmental Crimes, DAILY ENV’T REP., July 1, 1992, at D8
(reporting on Ninth Circuit appellate Judge Pamela Rymer’s belief that corporate fines should
be greater than the cost of implementing a compliance program).
219. Professors Fisse and Braithwaite note that although punishing a corporation may
unfairly distribute the punishment to innocent employees, shareholders, and consumers, such a
situation does not preclude punishing the corporation. They liken the situation to one wherein
a family suffers when one of their kin is convicted and sentenced to prison. The suffering of
the family member is different in kind from that of the offender. Even though innocent
employees, shareholders, and consumers may suffer from an organization’s environmental
offense, they themselves are not subject to the stigma of the conviction. They assume the “risks”
involved in such relationships, and they would unjustly reap the benefits of illegal activity
should the corporation not be criminally punished for its crime. See FISSE & BRAITHWAITE,
supra note 214, at 50.
220. See Interview, supra note 124.
221. See Gruner, supra note 65, at 212 (“[T]he Commission has stated that completion of
organizational fine guidelines for environmental offenses is still a top priority.”) (citing United
States Sentencing Commission, Notice of Priority Areas for Commission Research and Amendment
Study, 60 FED. REG. 49,316, 49,317 (Sept. 22, 1995)); Nagel & Swenson, supra note 29, at 258
(“The development of environmental guidelines will constitute an important next step in the

Professors Silecchia and Malinowiski have stated, “[r]egardless of
[the] shortcomings [of the Proposed Guidelines], Congress has
criminalized the environmental offenses of corporations. Thus,
courts deserve . . . . a sentencing scheme tailored to organizational
environmental offenses.”222
It has been six years since the Proposed Guidelines were first
considered for adoption.223 In that time, little has been done to
either revise or even discuss them, despite the fact that the
Commission continues to receive increasingly more corporate
environmental cases every year.224 Although the Proposed Guidelines
may need to be reformulated to some degree, they nevertheless offer
a solid foundation upon which to build needed organizational
guidelines for environmental crimes.
Though there are currently no Commissioners, it is likely that
these vacancies will be filled soon.225 In light of the arguments
presented in this Comment, one of the first tasks those
Commissioners should undertake is the implementation of fine
guidelines for organizational environmental crime. Organizational
environmental crime is simply too important an issue to be without
sentencing guidelines. In the words of the British jurist Lord Hewart,
“[i]t is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental
importance that justice should not only be done, but should
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”226 Implementing
fine guidelines for organizational environmental crime will show that
justice is being done in the sentencing of organizations for
environmental crime.

evolution of the corporate Sentencing Guidelines.”); Coffee, supra note 29, at 5 (opining that
the Commission will eventually adopt guidelines for organizational environmental crime). But
see Starr & Braker, supra note 32, at 2 (noting that the proposed organizational guidelines for
environmental crimes appear to be stalled).
222. Silecchia & Malinowski, supra note 111, at 232; see also USAM 1997, supra note 143, § 511.114(a) (recognizing Congress’ intent to prosecute corporations criminally for violations of
federal environmental laws) (citing, i.e., 33 U.S.C §§ 1319(c)(5), 1362(5) (1994) (setting fines
specifically for corporate violations of the CWA).
223. See supra note 30.
224. See supra note 150 (discussing the increased number of federal environmental
prosecutions and convictions).
225. See REHNQUIST, supra note 34 (urging the President and Congress to appoint
Commissioners as soon as possible).
226. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS, supra note 115, at 250.

APPENDIX A
THE ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES’ OFFENSE LEVEL FINE TABLE227
Offense Level

Amount

6 or less
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38 or more

$5,000
$7,500
$10,000
$15,000
$20,000
$30,000
$40,000
$60,000
$85,000
$125,000
$175,000
$250,000
$350,000
$500,000
$650,000
$910,000
$1,200,000
$1,600,000
$2,100,000
$2,800,000
$3,700,000
$4,800,000
$6,300,000
$8,100,000
$10,500,000
$13,500,000
$17,500,000
$22,000,000
$28,500,000
$36,000,000
$45,500,000
$57,500,000
$72,500,000

227. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.4(d) (rejecting the Offense Level Fine
Table for the Organizational Guidelines).

APPENDIX B
THE ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES’ CULPABILITY SCORE TABLE228
Culpability/MinimumMaximumScore

Multiplier-Multiplier

10 or more
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0 or less

2.00-4.00
1.80-3.60
1.60-3.20
1.40-2.80
1.20-2.40
1.00-2.00
0.80-1.60
0.60-1.20
0.40-0.80
0.20-0.40
0.05-0.20

228. See id. § 8C2.6 (rejecting the Culpability Score Table for the Organizational
Guidelines).

APPENDIX C
THE PROPOSED GUIDELINES’ FINE TABLE229
Percentage Range Of
Offense Level

Statutory Maximum

0 to 6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24 or more

10-10
10-20
15-25
20-30
25-35
30-40
30-50
35-55
40-60
45-65
50-70
55-75
60-80
65-85
70-90
75-95
80-100
85-100
100

229. See PROPOSED GUIDELINES, reprinted in Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, supra note
111, at 1384 (showing the Fine Table for the Proposed Guidelines).

